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ABSTRACT

Since the establishment of the Post–2015 Development Agenda and the 2030 Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs), the international community has considerably maintained that
private sector leadership will be a crucial factor in supporting sustainable development,
especially in emerging and developing economies. Since 2008 many traditional commercial
banks who are crucial financial actors have retreated from the capital markets due to increased
regulations and mandatory capital ratios. Additionally, government expenditure has also
decreased due to budget constraints in the post-crisis years. This retraction of traditional sources
of finance, combined with a significant increase in the demand for capital has created multiple
financing gaps throughout different markets. Considering this, the most considerable financing
gap prevalent in the markets today is in infrastructure expenditure and long–term sustainable
assets in developing markets. A potential solution to alleviate these long–term infrastructure and
sustainable development funding gaps is unlocking the large pool of private sector capital,
mostly in the hands of private institutional investors, such as pension funds, mutual funds, and
sovereign wealth funds (SWFs).
Considering the importance of institutional investors in development finance, I identify
some critical obstacles that institutional investors are having when considering long-term
alternative market investments in developing economies. Many of these obstacles deal with the
misalignment between investor mandate and the characteristics of long-term sustainable assets.
To overcome this problem, I argue that SWFs are more effective in funding the infrastructure
financing gap than other institutional investors. The inherent characteristics of SWFs and their
governance structure makes them perfect candidates to provide the long-term financing needed
to transition into a sustainable economy. This paper shows how SWFs are a necessary apparatus
in reaching our global environmental and shared economic objectives.

KEYWORDS: Sustainable Development, Private Finance, Portfolio allocation, Institutional
Investors, Sovereign Wealth Funds, Collaborative Investment Strategies.
JEL CLASSIFICATIONS: G15; G18; G23; G28; H54; J26
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I. INTRODUCTION

Addressing the economic and social consequences of climate change is one of the central
socioeconomic policy concerns of our time and possibly the most critical. According to the
current scientific consensus, the scale and pace of climate change has the potential to cause
severe and potentially irreversible impacts on our entire socioecological system. Indeed, in
recent decades, climate change has been accompanied by increasing global temperature, rising
sea levels, deterioration of the biosphere, increasing volatility in weather patterns, and the
depletion of our natural resources. These economic, social, and environmental challenges call
for an urgent transformation across the entire investment value chain and our global social
sphere. Climate change is not just a national issue but a global challenge, which must be
addressed through joint capabilities and cooperation among all stakeholders.
In the coming decades, we must design strategies, implement reforms, and redirect
focus on preserving the planet. Conversely, the future survival of our species and the
conservation of our planets' entire ecological system requires the development of sustainable
economic architecture and enhanced mobilization of capital toward "greener" assets (UNCTAD
2018). It aims to turn poverty, inequality, and lack of financial access into new market
opportunities for smart, progressive, profit-oriented companies and their shareholders. While
some may disagree with what constitutes a sustainable economy, there are a few principles
seldom disputed: a sustainable economy aligns with nature's regeneration capacity, limits carbon
emissions, strives for resource efficiency, fully employs renewable energy sources, and
regulates producers to eliminate adverse outcomes. In the report Our Common Future published
by the Brundtland Commission, defines sustainable development as “development that meets
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
own needs (Brundtland Commission 1987) At its core, sustainable development means
investing in ethical companies, reliable infrastructure, and financing green innovation that will
impact our futures. For consistency in this report, sustainable infrastructure, sustainable
development, and green infrastructure are inclusively intertwined.
In tribute to the vision of the first environmental pioneers of the last century and those
that came before them, in September 2015, the General Assembly of the United Nations,
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adopted the 2030 Agenda for Global Economic Development which included Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs), also known as the 2030 Agenda (UN 2015). The SDGs were first
designed in 2012 by the General Assembly of the United Nations, to replace the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) (UNEP 2017). These newly established 2030 SDGs were ratified
in 2015 and set ambitions to eradicate global poverty, hunger, illiteracy, disease, and global
warming (UDAP 2018). A chart of the 17 SDGs can be seen below in figure 1. The SDGs
outline 17 development goals that are set out to be achieved by 2030. The goals cover a variety
of topics that ranges from social, economic, and environmental issues and correspond to 169
sustainable targets that detail how to reach the overall SDGs (UNEP 2017). While ambitious,
the SDGs offer a common pathway for development policy that highlights the importance of our
shared human values.

Figure 1. The 17 Universally Accepted 2030 Sustainable Development Goals

Source: United Nations (2015)

The “2018 Trade and Development Report” (UNCTAD 2018) explains that the growing
field of sustainable development is an additional solution to the traditional economic
7

development issues, and it focuses on a more holistic approach to development. Considering
this, development specialists who wish to adhere to sustainable implementation practices will
have to confront the challenges of a changing economic landscape while at the same time
including the three pillars of sustainable development: social development, economic growth,
and environmental protection (Pop 2013). The first pillar of sustainable development is social
development, meaning that development must effectually remove the barriers that limit people
from living fulfilling and dignified lives. Second is economic growth, which is the promotion of
societal wealth through trade and enterprise. The third pillar of sustainable development is
environmental protection, its primary concern is the preservation of our planet and biosphere.
Inherit in the structure of the SDGs; these three pillars provide an outline that can guide policy
implementation and the economic mitigation of sustainable processes.

Institutional Investing and Alternative Investors
The recent regulatory and structural changes that occurred after the 2008 financial crisis
considerably limited traditional bank and commercial financing options from both public and
private market. Additionally, as noted in the “2017 SDG Investment Case” foreign direct
investment to developing economies and emerging markets have weakened in the past few years
causing more significant concern in financing the SDGs (Runde, Savoy, and Miller 2018). Thus,
the retraction of traditional sources of financing and international development assistance from
intergovernmental organizations like the world bank has prompted the formation of large
financing gaps, which limit the flexibility of existing long-term infrastructure projects and the
transition into a sustainable economy (Mather 2017). Indeed, in the decades to come, unlocking
capital to achieve sustainable goals is one of the greatest challenges in advancing development
initiatives. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) concludes that "current
financing and investment patterns will not deliver the sustainable development goals." SchmidtTraub (2015) makes it clear that the global community will fall short of these climate policy
initiatives by wide margins unless investment barriers are removed, stronger partnerships are
formed, and more private resources that are in the hands of institutional investors, are mobilized
to fill the critical financing gaps.
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Institutional investors represent a diverse range of investor types, such as pension funds,
mutual funds, insurance companies, and sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). These large financial
companies receive less regulatory oversight than traditional commercial banks and have
significant assets under management. In fact, Hans-Peter Egler and Raul Frazao (2016) mention
that these large institutional investors facilitate approximately 70 percent of the global trading of
financial assets. One of the commonly cited advantages of institutional investors is that they can
easily inject liquidity into global capital markets and supply financing into areas requiring it.
These investors often prefer to take long-term horizons on investments that offer capital
scalability and that have adaptable liquidity features (Kharas and McArthur 2014). As such,
given the enlarging infrastructure financing gap, institutional investors and other private sector
financial actors will be major players in realigning the global economy and laying the
foundation for a decarbonized future.
Due to their inherent importance in the global economy, institutional investors will have
a critical responsibility in conducting a leadership role in transitioning into a low-carbon
economy and as long-term asset managers. With the creation of the SDGs, investors now have a
tremendous opportunity to support this global agenda by increasing the amount of capital into
high-impact projects that address societal and economic challenges. According to Johnathan
Woetzel et al. (2017), just achieving one goal (such as gender equality) could contribute up to
$28 trillion to global GDP by 2025. The SDGs demand that financial managers coordinate
investment synergies and adhere to a common governance and investment criteria which aligns
with a common environmental, social, and governance (ESG) framework (Mather 2017).1 Amit
Bouri et al. (2018) notes that the ESG criteria is used in the financial markets and by investors to
evaluate corporate behavior, strategies, and practices so that investors can determine the future
performances of companies.
On the other hand, governments and international organizations must maintain a
responsible policy framework to allow for further public-private coordination that addresses the
1

The environmental, social, and governance (ESG) is a set of environmental standards that investors use to critique
investment projects. The environmental criteria’s’ aim to address how companies perform as stewards of the natural
environment. Social criteria’s purpose is based on the companies' ability to address the concerns of the
communities which it operates and the clients it works with. The governance criteria is applied to the company’s
leadership, management, and shareholder rights to ensure the effective management of the organization (Pandit and
Tamhane 2018).
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core concerns of the SDGs. As stated in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, both
policymakers and investors must ensure that neither humans nor our industrial activity will harm
or burden the ecosystem in which we live (UN 2015). This is especially true in developing
economies and emerging markets, which offer the most significant opportunity for investors to
act as a catalyst for structural transformation. If the SDGs are to be achieved in developing
countries, it must be through more significant calibration between investors and governments,
and by forming more diverse financial partnerships.

Outline of This Thesis
Throughout this report, I will address obstacles limiting the 2030 Agenda and show how they
can be overcome. I confirm that it is vital for developing nations to obtain private institutional
finance to transition to a sustainable economy. In chapter 2, I give a historical account of
sustainable economic policy and how the 2030 Sustainable Agenda evolved. In chapter 3, I
discuss the attributes of private infrastructure investment and the role institutional investors can
play in transitioning to a low-carbon economy. I give insight on investors strategies and analyze
the result of portfolio choices, in relation to their balance sheet structure, risk/return trade-offs,
short vs. long-term returns, and general state of aversion.
In chapter 4, I analysis the role that the public sector and host governments can play in
offering direction and guidance for investors who wish to invest in their economies. I also
discuss corporate governance issues and how the in chapter 5, I discuss the importance of SWFs
and demonstrate that SWFs critical to financing long-term investments in capital projects, I
recommend that the inherent characteristics of SWFs make them a unicorn in development
finance. I give examples of how SWFs will be key players in sustainable development efforts,
through their ability to optimize their relations with global organizations, governments, and
other investors. I show that improved and legally requiring reporting standards will enhance
transparency among SWFs. I also offer policy recommendations for investment portfolio
practices and financial managers who have the ability to influence the capital flows of SWFs.
Finally, in chapter 6, is my conclusion.
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II. THE SUSTAINABLE PATH: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

In order to study the roots of sustainable development and interaction between humans and the
environment, it is essential to analyze the evolution of social development and human progress
that led to its development. Jacobus Du Pisani (2007) explains that the demand for raw materials
and their impact on the environment have been a constant issue throughout human history.
While the roots of sustainability can be traced back to ancient times, the emergence of the
industrial age which corresponded with the depletion of our natural resources heightened fears
that unconstrainted growth will have adverse effects on future generations. At the dawn of the
industrial revolution, Thomas Malthus (1798) examined the relationship between population
growth that was an attribute of an expanding economy and the decline in natural resources.
Others, like Malthus pointed to similar scenarios. In the book Our Wonderful Century, Alfred
Wallace (1898) concluded that the damage done by the “reckless destruction of the stored-up
products of nature and regarded exploitation of the rain forests as an injury done to our
posterity.”
By the 20th century, as a result of the industrialization of the previous century, all
aspects of life, from the material economy to the very fabric of society itself, had been altered. It
was soon realized that progress had its limits, and while industrial capitalism brought
tremendous advances in economic growth and technology, it also devastated the environment
that supports life. As such by the latter part of the 20th century the commonly held scientific
consensus was that without concrete global action, then environmental degradation and the
changing climate will burden all sectors and all nations. This follows Woetzel (2017), who
warns that without aggressive action to control carbon emissions, the progression of climate
change could devastate our ecosystem, and possibly wreak havoc on the world economy.
The good news is that in recent decades, strenuous initiatives to build a flexible,
sustainable policy framework for global social and economic development have been
multiplying and accelerating around the world. In responding to the environmental degradation
that was attributed from the industrial age, the international community has diligently formed
enormous global initiatives with all stakeholders, including governments, corporations,
investors, and even asset managers. These initiatives have prompted governments to realign
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their economic development policies with sustainable principles. Speaking on behalf of the
global response to climate change, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) stated in their annual
Living Planet Report (2018) “although the biodiversity of the planet is decreasing, the global
commitments to addressing these issues has the possibility to reverse the effects of climate
change and environmental degradation.”
Yet the extent to which sustainable policies have infiltrated the global economy has
been limited. The investment patterns and capital formation in sustainable sectors are currently
insufficient to meet the demands of the changing economic system and lack the capability to
achieve the 2030 Agenda, Daniel Runde, Conor Savoy, and Aaron Miller (2018) explain the
largest constraint in sustainable investing is measuring the impact of assets that investors carry
in their portfolios. In particular, investors have difficulties in knowing if their allocations are
improving the SDGs and helping achieve the goals set out in the Paris Agreement. Addressing
these challenges in portfolio management is key. Thus, Simon Zadek and Nick Robins (2014)
reiterate that providing an efficient and effective sustainable investment guideline will be
needed to achieve more significant climate-related improvements. As was noted, the perplexities
of these challenges, has motivated the international community to formed new initiatives that
aim to tackle the environmental degradation attributed to unsustainable economic processes.
These new initiatives aim to redirect the course of economic development onto a more
sustainable path.
With that said, 2015 was a historic year because it marked the dawn in a new age in
sustainable development. That year saw three crucial agreements that will define the global
relations for the coming decades: namely, the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals, the Addis
Ababa Action on Financing for Development, and the Paris Climate Agreement (UNCTAD
2018). In the wake of these three momentous climate deals, governments, international
organizations, and private investors have been diligently coordinating blueprints and strategies
to offer new perspectives and support for sustainable development efforts. Along with other
global and national initiatives,2 These new development strategies (Paris Climate Agreement,

2

These include the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the World Summit on Sustainable
Development, the World Summit for Social Development, the Program of Action of the International Conference
on Population and Development, the Beijing Platform for Action and the United Nations Conference on Sustainable
Development.
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the SDGs, and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda), were known as the Post-2015 Development
Agenda during their formation between 2012–2015. The new development agenda has
ambitious to support the transition of the entire economic system and guide investors into a
more sustainable future. More importantly, is that these agreements and treaties represent the
most unifying global initiatives that have ever taken place on the international stage. In this
paper, I refer to these three these initiatives as the 2030 Agenda.
The 2030 Agenda outlines a common shared world vision that is inclusive, holistic,
measurable, and meaningful (OECD 2014). It's inclusive because it provides a framework that
seeks to lower the asymmetries between the developed and developing economies. It's holistic
because these global partnerships ensure that that ending poverty, inequality, and other
deprivations are its highest priority. Finally, the agenda is measurable and meaningful because it
ensures that global stakeholders can cooperate more efficiently and track the progress of
sustainable initiatives through a more robust and transparent accountability system. In terms of
addressing the issue with climate change, perhaps the agenda is the most meaningful global pact
ever formed because it integrates climate mitigation and adaptation processes into a consistent
and rigorous manner, addresses the setbacks in sustainable assets, and create synergies across
investment arenas (Nicolai et al. 2015). It concludes that transitioning to sustainable economic
processes requires the effort of all stakeholders in the economy, from international organizations
to individual governments, and gives more considerable attention on the mobilization of private
capital strategies (Nicolai et al. 2015).
Consequently, to ensure the success of the SDGs, policymakers and intergovernmental
organizations have the responsibility in coordinating guidelines and incentives that attract
investment into sustainable sectors. In fact, UNCTAD (2018), UNDP (2018), estimated “that
globally achieving the SDGs will take between $5 - $7 trillion annually. Besides the costs, the
most important aspect of meeting the SDGs will be the challenge of measuring the progress of
these societal objectives, deploying private sector capital, and strategically aligning investment
mandates with green assets, especially in developing economies (Nicolai et al. 2015). In this
next section, I will discuss the movements that had taken place to resolve some of the challenges
within the Post-2015 Development Agenda and the formation that lead to the formation of the
2030 Agenda.
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The Addis Ababa Action Agenda
Within the development community, the conflict between sustainable development and
developing economies has been a persistent obstacle. Despite the improving economic and
social trends as a result of the Monterrey Conference3 established in 2002, developing countries
still face enormous challenges in implementing these sustainable initiatives. Once again, in
forming the Post-2015 Development Agenda, it became clear that developing countries will
require a significant amount of capital and financing focus (World Bank 2013). This follows
Egler and Frazao (2016) who make it clear, that due to differences in local conditions, cultures,
and government frameworks, some options that might work in one country may not be suitable
in another country. To address these asymmetries in capital formation faced by smaller actors,
in September 2015, the United Nations held the Third Financing for Development Conference
in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (Anderson and Chonghaile 2015). The product of the conference was
the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (also referred to as Action Agenda), and it established a
framework for applying sustainable development through three dimensions, inclusive economic
growth, protecting the environment, and promoting social inclusion by 2030.
The Action Agenda was established based on solving the shortcomings of previous
development agreements and to accelerate sustainable growth in emerging economies.
Furthermore, it provided a framework to consider country-level concerns within a global
context. A key highlight of the report was that it established guidelines for developing nations
so they can efficiently mobilize finance in their economies. The guidelines included two
important premises. First, there must be a shift in diplomatic practices that allows a greater
contribution to global policymaking from emerging and smaller nations. A recent United
Nations report noted that "if inequalities are going to be addressed, development failures
improved, and greater opportunities provided, social progress in emerging economies must be

3

The 2002 United Nations International Conference on Financing for Development or the Monterrey Conference,
resolved to address the challenges of financing for development around the world, particularly in developing
countries. The goals of the conference were to eradicate poverty, achieve sustained economic growth, and promote
sustainable development. The conference saw the cooperation between heads of states, the United Nations, the
World Bank, and the International Monterrey Fund (U.N. 2015).
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one of the main priorities of development" (UNDP 2018). Second, policymakers must strike a
balance between their public responsibilities and the facilitation of productive investment from
private investors (Anderson and Chonghaile 2015). Based on these premises the Action Agenda
went beyond the Monterrey Conference to fully consider the more extensive and more diverse
financing needs associated with sustainable development and recognized the crucial need for
private finance to support the SDGs, particularly in developing economies (Anderson and
Chonghaile 2015).
The Action Agenda stressed the importance of investors realigning portfolios to consider
long-term investment strategies, and it spelled out the strategies that nations can implement to
attract private financial resources to their economies. It stressed the importance that
governments design a flexible policy framework that focuses on the collaboration between
private finance and public development efforts. It encouraged actively learning and working
with other governments to ensure the best policy approach to implement the SDGs. It gave
examples of how some progressively minded nations have taken the first steps to combat
climate change by designing new policies to implement the SDGs and the Paris Climate
agreement. Finally, the Action Agenda showed how some policies are improving development
efforts and how more initiatives can foster greater calibration among governments,
multinational development banks, and the private sector (Anderson and Chonghaile 2015).
In short, the Action Agenda addressed sustainable efforts in developing countries and
highlighted the need for smaller actors to take more of a leadership role in development policy.
Thus, amid its vast array of complexities and constraints, the Action Agenda encouraged that
development finance implement more holistic policies and address the social, economic, and
environmental concerns associated with the overall well-being of society. Mark Anderson and
Clar Ni Chonghaile (2015) highlight that the ratification of the Action Agenda signified that its
members are committed to “promoting peaceful and inclusive societies and in advancing fully
towards a more equitable global economic system where no country is left behind.”

The Paris Climate Agreement
After the formation of Addis Ababa Action Agenda and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development, the next major international summit was the Paris Climate Agreement which took
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place in December 2015. The primary purpose of the Paris Agreement, also called the Paris
Accord, was that it established internationally recognized goals to keep global temperatures
from rising above 2oC from pre-industrial levels (1850 -1900) and to pursue efforts to limit the
temperature increase even further to 1.5oC (Voysey, Stacey, and Allison 2016). The agreement
was signed by 175 states and represents the most comprehensive international agreement that
considered the health of the planet as its main priority. It was also instrumental in strengthening
the ability of countries to deal with the impacts of climate change and formed a cohesive
international strategy to limit greenhouse gases.
Central to the success of the Paris Agreement was the intended nationally determined
contributions (INDCs). Article 4 of the Paris Agreement (2015) states, "that member nations
determine their implementation plans, measurement variables, and reporting procedures as to
reduce carbon emissions.” After each nation voluntarily submits their INDCs, these INDCs will
maintain a coherent system for the systemic global reporting of emissions. As such, by
incorporating these INDCs, signatories have systematically strengthened the global response to
climate change. For example, the United States, who later had ambitions to withdrawal from the
deal, promised to cut carbon emissions up to 28 percent from 2005 levels (Bielenbeg et al.
2016). Other countries, many who have economies heavily reliant on non-renewable resources
announced even higher ambitions. The main point is that the INDCs represent a global carbon
budget, that can be used as a tool to combat climate change (UNCTAD 2018).
The grand ambitions of the Paris Agreement present an immediate challenge to scale up
green finance, particularly in long-term investments and infrastructure. To reach its goals, the
deal emphasized the role that private finance must play in supporting the energy transition and
infrastructure demands of developing economies (Voysey, Stacey, and Allison 2016).
Prioritizing private finance follows the Paris Agreements third objective, "that finance flows
must be consistent with a pathway towards lower greenhouse gas emissions and climateresilient development" (Paris Agreement 2015). In other words, the Paris Agreement built a
framework for development, that ensured more efficient resource allocation through long-term
decarbonization strategies and the reallocation of those resources to low-carbon assets. As such
Voysey, Stacey, and Allison (2016) note, "that signatories of the Paris Agreement reaffirmed
that the policies are irreversible and reflect a common but differentiated responsibilities and
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respective capabilities." In short, the Paris Agreement was an important step in creating a global
network that will make transitioning to a sustainable economy much more realistic.

Challenges Ahead: Transitioning to a Sustainable Economy
One of the first pioneers of environmentalism, Paul Hawken (1993), once said, “the first rule of
sustainability is to align development with natural forces, or at least not try to defy them.”
Hawken believed that ecological problems that characterize our civilization mainly are
structural issues and are not unfixable. Consequently, despite valiant efforts by the international
community to address climate change, the level of greenhouse gases continues to rise,
investment is insufficient, and traditional energy sources remain in high demand. In fact, in
2015 the “Development Progress” report, gave the international community an "F" in achieving
the SDGs' related to reducing income inequality, combating climate change, eliminating waste,
and ensuring the protection of marine environments by 2030 (Nicolai et al. 2015). The report
notes that at the individual country-level, progress can be possible, but only if governments
work cohesively with their citizens and put strategies in place to meet the goals.
That said, some countries like the United States—who is notably one of the world's
largest polluters—has been actively seeking to roll back the progress that has been achieved in
federal and international environmental policy. Since 2017, the US has planned to withdraw
from the Paris Agreement as well as other global climate initiatives in the coming years. While
the current state of political affairs in the U.S. is worrisome, the U.S. will not actually be able to
completely withdraw from the Paris Agreement until 2020, due to the initial four-year
agreement that was signed in 2016 (Voysey, Stacey, and Allison 2016). As a result of the U.S.
retraction in multilateral leadership, many international, state, and local actors have tried to fill
the void in the fight against climate change (Pal 2018). In fact, over 100 city and local officials
represented the US at the 2017 Unite Nations Climate Change Conference in Bonn, Germany to
show that many American leaders and local citizens are willing to continue the fight, despite the
federal government’s retraction.
The ratification of the Post-2015 Development Agenda marked the dawn of a new age in
development finance and international cooperation. A recent UN report explains that "the Post2015 Development Agenda signifies that the global initiatives which aim to preserve our planet
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must go hand-in-hand with the strategies that spur economic growth and improve investment
opportunities” (UNEP 2017). Its creation seized the vision of so many who have been fighting
for a clean and sustainable future for the last century. One such person was, John F. Kennedy
(1963) who said: "United there is little we cannot do in a host of cooperative ventures." It is not
to bold to state, that the initiatives that established the 2030 Agenda possibly have formed the
most important cooperative venture of our modern age.

The Emergence of Sustainable Development
It is essential to recognize that this excitement directed towards climate health and
environmental preservation has not always been a central concern in economic development
policy and is relatively a recent phenomenon over the past quarter century (U.N. 2015). By the
late 1960s and early 1970s, it became increasingly evident that there were significant downsides
to scientific and technological advances of the last hundred years. The idea of a sustainable
economy was first detailed in the 1972 publication The Limits of Growth (Meadows and
Meadows 1972). Its authors emphasized the importance of rethinking economic development
and realigning policy to include environmental considerations. First, the book addresses issues
faced by exponential global economic growth and the damage that CO 2 emissions have had on
the environment. They predicted that if the current economic system were to remain unchecked,
life on earth would not survive much past the year 2100 (Meadows and Meadows 1972). 4 After
the publication of the book, many international organizations, such as the United Nations, began
to shift their policy to address the issues of climate change and environmental decay. Du Pisani
(2007) regards the publication of the Limits to Growth as a key moment in sustainable
development history that “put the anxiety about environmental problems into a more focused
discussion and onto a political agenda.”
Later that same year, the growing need for environmental policy spurred the United
Nations to hold its first conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, Sweden (U.N.
2015). At the conference, the Swedish government—who at the time was instrumental in
4

Limits of Growth was published in 1972 by Donella H. Meadows and Dennis Meadows. The goals of the book
were to gain insights into the limits of our world system and identify the long-term behaviors of that impact the
natural systems. Its predictions show that given business as usual with no changes to historical growth trends, the
limits of growth on earth would become evident by 2072.
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outlining the path to a more sustainable economy—provided four principles for reaching a
sustainable socioecological system. Anderson and Chonghaile (2015) explain that these four
principles can be used as a care instruction for our planet. They include reducing our
dependence on fossil fuels and heavy metals; reducing our dependence on synthetic chemicals;
reducing the destruction of our natural environment; and ensuring we are not limiting the global
demands of people now or in the future, especially those in the least–development economies
(LDCs), by destroying the resources that support us. The principles urged private and public
leaders to integrate sustainable policies as a central theme in their organizations and recognized
that climate concerns can only be addressed through regional and international cooperation.
The recognition of the term “sustainable development” was further outlined in the 1987
Brundtland Commission report, Our Common Future (1987).5 The report played an essential
role in addressing several concerns related to development in the coming century, and it
recognized that human activity and production processes were having detrimental impacts on
the environment. The message was evident throughout the report: the global ecosystem that
supports life cannot support the present rates of our economic and population growth in the
centuries to come (IISD 2010). It outlined that "sustainable development is a type of
development which meets the needs of the present without comprising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs" (Brundtland Commission 1987). Although at the time the
report might have fallen short of its initial goals, in the following years, the imaginative
framework of the report would be a significant turning point in sustainable development
initiatives.
The new consensus that had grown through the advances in sustainable economic policy
in the 1980s would lay the foundation for practical solutions for the coming decades. It was in
the 1990s that public financing institutions and commercial banks began applying sustainable
principles to investments, such as incorporating disaster-resilient infrastructure, reporting
climate-risks, and applying carbon output measurements (UNEP 2018). Private investors began
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The Brundtland Report (1987) alerted the world to the dangers that humans are having on the environment and
stated the urgency to employ economic practices that could be sustained without depleting the natural resources
around us. The report highlighted the concept of sustainable development: environmental protection, economic
growth, and social equity. The report suggested that these three principles are simultaneously possible and that each
country is capable of achieving its full economic potential while at the same time enhancing its resource base.
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adjusting their investment mandates to include sustainable principles, such as ethical
management practices, social impact funds, and carbon emission assessments. These
developments were spawned by the 1992 First International Conference on Sustainable
Development, (also known as the Rio Earth Summit) organized by the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The Rio Earth Summit was the
international community’s first attempt at outlining strategies to lay the basis for a more
sustainable pattern of development (IISD 2010). It offered clear ethical guidelines for corporate
practices and maintained that sustainable policy must be flexible enough to adapt to changes in
the economic systems that it commands. While the term sustainable development was never
explicitly mentioned at the conference, the international community commonly agreed on the
notion that both development and the environment could be managed in a mutually beneficial
way (UNEP 2017). In other words, sustainable development was meant to find a balance
between the limits to growth and the need for holistic development.
In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol was established in Kyoto, Japan. At this conference, parties
agreed to establish targets and timetables to reduce global emissions, particularly in developed
countries like Canada and Germany. The signatories agreed to cut carbon emissions by 5
percent below 1990 levels and report their progress. The Kyoto Protocol allowed nations to
incorporate a series of market-based mechanisms that enabled developed countries to use both
public and private forms of carbon-emission trading techniques to achieve their targets. At the
time, the Kyoto Protocol influenced many private sector investors to incorporate an
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) criteria into their decision-making processes
(UNEP 2017). While the treaty faced continued discrepancies, it eventually came into effect in
2005, but some large countries, like the U.S., were not participants. Despite the initial failures of
the Kyoto Protocol, the persistence of the international community remained. The countries who
did adopt the protocol's commitments—lowering greenhouse gases through national measures—
began to implement its considerations between 2005 and 2012. Though the Kyoto Protocol had
its challenges, it was a major steppingstone to the much larger Paris Agreement proposed in
2015.
As we entered the new millennium, sustainable development and low-emission energy
sources became a premier topic of interest. The advances in technology and data analysis in
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climate modeling made it clear that global warming was severely devastating our planet and
presented dire consequences for our future (IISD 2010). During the early 2000s, the topic of
sustainable development had dominated the discussion boards and policy considerations of
international organizations, such as the World Bank and the United Nations. At the heart of
these policy discussions were the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The MDGs which
were established in 2000 at the Millennium Summit of the United Nations, marked a major
change in development strategy and U.N. policy (UN 2015). It was here for the first time in
history that the United Nations narrowed its focus of development standards to several
universally accepted goals, giving countries an outline to direct investment efforts and internal
development procedures. Mainly, the MDGs focused on poverty alleviation and disease
eradication, but fell short of requiring any legally binding reporting disclosures (World Bank
2013). The legacy of the MDGs was powerful and paved the way for further progress to be
made in climate policy and sustainable development practices. Later, the United Nations
International Conference on Financing for Development hosted the Monterrey Consensus in
2002, which distinguished the need for developing countries to take responsibility for their
poverty reduction and the need for rich countries to support them through economic aid and
international trade (World Bank 2013). It embodied a multidimensional nature of the global
development challenge by promoting a more holistic and adaptable approach to the MDGs. As
was noted in by Anderson and Chonghaile (2015) the Monterrey Consensus promoted “open,
equitable, rules-based, predictable, and a nondiscriminatory multilateral trading and financial
systems that will benefit all countries.”
The establishment of the Kyoto Protocol, the MDGs, and the Monterrey Consensus, laid
out new development architecture that redirected policy toward confronting the challenges faced
by the world's most vulnerable people (IISD 2010). While these agreements were major
milestones in their respective subjects, they had their deficiencies, mainly compliant countries
had issues in reporting, implementing, and measuring progress. Furthermore, it was unclear
whether the goals would improve development outcomes or alleviate the growth constraints in
developing economies. A major setback in these agreements was the inability for them to
address the consequences of climate change. Though they could offer guidance and
recommendations, such intention would inevitably fall short of achieving their intended goals.
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Climate change became more of a prevalent issue in the new millennium after many devastating
climate events in the first decade of the 21st century—whether it was horrific hurricanes (ea.
Katrina, Andrew, etc.), wildfires in California, or tsunamis in the Pacific—these events posed
significant problems to global infrastructure, health, and development. To address these issues,
the United Nations in 2012 began forming the 2030 Agenda that would guide development
policy through the years after 2016–2030. The main priority of the 2030 Agenda, was to address
environmental, economic, and social concerns by providing countries a common framework to
guide development strategy.
Consequently, just in this century, we will see billions of people in developing
economies obtain a decent standard of living, witness an enormous growth in population, and
will have to deal with the increasing demands of goods and services. Considering these factors,
the Principles for Responsible Investing (2017) states that the current economic system will not
be able to sustain the future global demand, without destroying the ecosystem that supports life
(PRI 2017). As such, the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement provide an excellent framework
to go about achieving the economic transformation that is required in the next decade. As the
impacts of climate change, demographic shifts, and the transition towards green energy become
more acute, addressing climate change and the goals outlined by the SDGs, require fast and
collective action and a continued commitment to low-carbon development. This correlates with
the recommendations of the 2018 report “Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals,”
(UNCTAD 2018) which mentions that transitioning to sustainability requires radically
reforming and refocusing investment from fossil fuels and high–carbon technologies to low–
carbon technologies.
More than ever, achieving a sustainable economy will require more partnerships and
collaborative initiatives with both private and public actors. The international community’s
increasing reliance on private institutional investing has shown how institutional investors have
redefined cross-border investment coordination and development policy throughout the world
(Egler and Frazao 2016). The increasing importance of both public and private initiatives
follows SDG 17, which refers to multi-stakeholder engagement and the need for greater
partnerships, particularly in relations between private sector financial institutions, corporations,
and governments. In the end, while transitioning into a sustainable economy will not be easy, its
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achievement would result in efficient and livable cities; low-carbon, smart and resilient
infrastructure; and the restoration of degraded lands and the natural environment (New Climate
Economy 2018).
As the former Secretary General to the United Nations Ban-Ki-Moon said in 2016, "I am
counting on the private sector to drive success….Trillions of dollars in private funds are to be
redirected towards the SDGs, creating huge opportunities for responsible companies to deliver
solutions" (U.N. 2015). In short, the 2030 Agenda represents the first time that the international
community has repeatedly emphasized the greater need for private sector leadership to meet the
sustainable initiatives.

III. THE ROAD AHEAD: ISSUES IN FINANCING SDGS

While the 2030 Agenda and its initiatives were necessary steps toward a world that is more
prosperous and inclusive, there are still major obstacles that are limiting progress in achieving
sustainable economic processes. Arguably, the most significant barrier to achieving sustainable
development is in the tremendous amount of investment coordination and costs associated with
long-term socioeconomic projects, such as infrastructure and real estate assets (Kharas and
McArthur 2014). The infrastructure financing gap is a major concern for emerging and
developing economies, given that they will account for 67 percent of the global economic
growth by 2030. Amal-Lee Amin and Karen Lockridge (2017) explain in that in the next thirty
years, population growth, migration, technological enhancement, and urbanization trends will
create critical needs for infrastructure development, especially in developing economies.
Albert Hirschman, in his 1985 study on The Strategy of Economic Development showed
that the proper development of infrastructure, including roads, ports bridges, schools, etc. is
crucial to the success of any economy. He continued by describing that large-scale
infrastructure planning is “a matter of faith in the development potential of a country or region”
(as cited from UNCTAD 2018). Hirschman analysis follows extensive evidence proving that
proper infrastructure planning can increase economic growth and development efforts (Tyson
2018; Anderson and Chonghaile 2015; Bhattacharya, Romani, and Stern 2012). Spending on
infrastructure improves access to essential public services, reduces inequality, fosters inclusion,
23

and supports innovative industrial sectors. UNCTAD (2018) notes that investing in
infrastructure can simultaneously address supply side constraints and thereby raise the
productivity of other sectors in the economy. As such, the development of infrastructure lies at
the center of the economy’s capacity to provide productive resources and alleviate poverty.
Likewise, the establishment of secure infrastructure networks is likely to improve the
investment attractiveness of the country's economy (OECD 2015).
Since infrastructure is the backbone of the traditional economy, it means that
sustainable infrastructure is the backbone of a sustainable and resilient economy. According to
Anderson and Chonghaile (2015) sustainable infrastructure is defined as “infrastructure that
integrates the environmental, social, and governance (ESG) aspects into project planning,
building, and operating phrases, while ensuring the resilience of the climate and the ecological
community.” Often, building sustainable infrastructure will incorporate highly trained project
managers and technological systems and environmentally safe materials and construction
practices. It even includes public service goods, such as environment safe public buildings, biodiverse parks, safe, clean neighborhoods, and reliable renewable energy sources (Tyson 2018).
Without sustainable infrastructure, it estimated that with the given current economic growth
rates and demand, expanding traditional infrastructure projects could lead to a 6–degree Celsius
rise in temperatures above preindustrial levels. On the contrary, expanding sustainable
infrastructure with same economic growth rates would mean emissions would be consistent with
the Paris Agreement goal of keeping the temperature from rising above 2-degree Celsius
(Beilenberg et al. 2016).
This vital need for sustainable infrastructure and industrial development is outlined in
goal 9 of the SDGs: build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable
industrialization (UN 2015). Additionally, goals relating to clean water (6), affordable and clean
energy (7), decent work (8), sustainable cities (11), production (12), and partnerships (17) all
mention, in some regard, the need for sustainable infrastructure. As the 2018 “Better Growth,
Better Climate” report concludes “the next 10–15 years is a unique ‘use it or lose it’ moment in
economic history,” that without long-term sustainable infrastructure financing we will lack the
capacity to support the economy of the future and lock the world into a high carbon pathway
(New Clime Economy 2018).
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Despite its importance, investment in infrastructure has not been enough to meet the
economic demands of today and certainly is not keeping on par with the growth rates needed to
achieve the 2030 SDGs. As of 2017, total infrastructure spending was around $2.5–3 trillion
annually for both advanced and developing economies, but Bielenberg et al. (2016) estimates
that to transition into a sustainable economy, infrastructure financing will have to double from
the current expenditure of $2.5-3 trillion to $6-7 trillion annually. Figure 2 shows, on average,
there is about a $3.3 trillion annual financing gap in infrastructure development. In particular,
Tyson (2018 estimated that developing economies will require around $1.5–2 trillion of longterm financing needs annually.

Figure 2. Estimate Infrastructure Investment Volume per Year 2017. USD Trillions
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The 2030 Agenda maintains that the implementation of proper sustainable development
addresses the core concern for our ecosystem decline, widening social fractures, and unrealized
economic potential. Bielenberg et al. (2016) note that ensuring infrastructure meets sustainable
standards will be a critical determinant of future economic growth and overall society
improvement. Therefore, according to the 2018 report “Better Growth, Better Climate” ensuring
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that new infrastructure development meets the standards outlined in the Paris Agreement, will
take an additional $4 trillion or about $270 billion annually. The report estimates the cumulative
infrastructure costs for the entire period of 2015–2030 could amount to around $90 trillion,
almost double the estimated $50 trillion value of the world's existing infrastructure stock. Over a
project’s life cycle, however, sustainable infrastructure can save money and generate healthy
economic returns for investors and the communities they impact.
According to Beilenberg et al. (2016) “The financing gap for sustainable infrastructure is
in large part the result of poor policies, institutional failures, and lack of investor familiarity
with greener technology and projects.” Thus, the current bottlenecks in sustainable
infrastructure financing limit long-term economic growth, industrial innovation, and diminishes
the capacity to achieve sustainable development. At the same time, delays in the realization of
infrastructure projects that lack funding pose additional costs on the society, affecting the leastdeveloped economies the most. Torsten Ehler (2014) explains that infrastructure projects which
are insufficiently funded are usually “badly designed and cannot deliver expected performance.”
Yet the need for resilient and sustainable infrastructure is more significant than ever, and
governments are consistently being pressured to ensure that infrastructure will be capable of
supporting the demands of rising populations, demographic shifts, and higher economic growth
rates. This presses the question, if the demands for infrastructure are so urgent, then why is there
a lack of successful investment projects? To answer this question, it is essential to consider the
two persistent financing issues within long-term infrastructure projects that governments face.
On the one hand, the traditional public sources of financing infrastructure have retreated
in recent years due to fiscal constraints and high government debt-to-GDP ratios. Considering
that the government is primarily responsible for infrastructure development, insufficiencies in
public infrastructure expenditure creates both economic as well as social challenges. In
particular, for many countries, the level of investment required for infrastructure exceeds their
budgetary possibilities (UNCTAD 2018). This is more of a concern in developing economies
which often have low tax-to-GDP ratios and a limited capacity to collect revenues from
investors and multinationals. Given the government’s inability to finance its liabilities,
subsequently, creates scarcities of public financial revenues, forces governments to serve other
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competing priorities (healthcare, social security, etc.) and focus less on infrastructure (Egler and
Frazao 2016).
On the other hand, many developing economies face underlying governance issues, such
as corruption and political instability. This was noted by Anderson and Choghaile (2015) who
explain that “funding infrastructure is being tragically undermined by international tax evasion,
avoidance, and secrecy laws, costing the least developed countries billions of dollars in capital
loses annually. They continue to explain that this, “lack of accountability and control of
directing capital flows for financing development has devastated economic growth” (Anderson
and Chonghaile 2015). In short, these public fiscal shortfalls limit the government’s ability to
meet their socioeconomic goals and provide for the common well-being of their citizens.
Furthermore, including the additional costs associated with sustainable infrastructure and
development efforts, means that these governments be even more constrained and lack the
ability to finance public needs. To solve this problem, governments will need to find creative
solutions to fill the financing gap that is limiting them from achieving their national sustainable
infrastructure development goals.

Optimizing Institutional Capital with Sustainable Infrastructure
A study by Woetzel et al. (2016) who found that the share of total infrastructure financing in
GDP will need to increase from around 3.8 percent to 5.6 percent in 2020. In emerging markets,
the required increase will be even more considerable. Foreseeing this public financing
conundrum, Egler and Frazao (2016) assert that though sustainable development initiatives will
still be mostly funded through domestic public expenditure and official development assistance,
the private sector will need to increasingly contribute to infrastructure through developing
innovative solutions to fill critical gaps that the public sector has trouble addressing. Tyson
(2018) states there is a growing consensus that governments who want to circumvent their tight
budgets and improve project outcomes are increasingly turning to more cost-efficient private
sector solutions (OECD 2015). As such, achieving the 2030 Agenda maintains that
infrastructure financing will need to come increasingly from the private sector.
Sharma (2018) explains that private investors can lead to more extensive economic and
social benefits to developing regions. Their impact can increase project optimization, market
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depth, efficient resource allocation, and provided expertise to vital economic projects. For
example, private sector organizations, such as the Private Infrastructure Development Group
(PIDG), has had tremendous success in working with governments to bring well-structured and
bankable infrastructure projects to the market. Since 2002, the organization has mobilized over
$33.7 billion from private sector investors to fund infrastructure projects in the least–developed
economies (UNEP 2017). Furthermore, the expanding role of the private sector has prompted
development organizations and governments to engage more with private financing actors in a
variety of agreements and partnerships (Kharas and McArthur 2014). For example, the
significant rise of public-private partnerships in the last twenty years has created new
opportunities in all industries and been a major contributor to alleviating capital constraints in
developing economies (Tyson 2018).
Other opportunities that governments can pursue with the private sector, include
contractual agreements that offer partial government funding to private long-term infrastructure
projects or offering tax breaks to attract private investors to sustainable projects (Weotzel et al.
2016). UNCTAD (2018) provides an excellent example of the Swiss Agency for Development
and Cooperation, who since 2016 has been coordinating with the private sector to initiate two
simultaneous SDGs initiatives. The first initiative was that the Swiss government proactively
work with the private sector to optimize innovative strategies to improve the alignment of
infrastructure development with set of environmental standards. Second, the Swiss government
has been active at utilizing private capital to increase the efficiency of its long-term
infrastructure projects and increasingly improving ways to integrate the SDGs into these
projects. Though it is vital for developing economies to learn from other countries, ultimately,
they should decide the best strategy that works for them. Whatever strategy a government
chooses to implement, optimizing private sector partners and capital will be increasingly
important to achieve the 2030 Agenda.
Therefore, with the weakening ability for public-entities to finance infrastructure and the
lack of sustainable infrastructure projects in developing economies, has motivated development
professionals to put more pressure on private sector leadership. Since 2018, The Argentinian
leadership of the G20 has continued to prioritize the mobilization of private sector capital to
regions in most need, stating that “developing infrastructure as an asset class holds great
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promise to channel the savings of today into public infrastructure, efficient transportation
services, basic sanitation, energy flows, and digital connectivity that will make each person of
today a global citizen and worker of tomorrow” (Tyson 2018). This follows article 2.1 of the
Paris Climate Agreement: “aims to strengthen the global response to climate change in the
context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty by… (c) Making financing
flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate resilient
development” (Paris Agreement 2015).
While strategies to fund infrastructure have changed over the years, engaging with
private finance is nothing new, since the 1990s private financial actors have been key in funding
long-term public constraints, especially in developing economies. The impact of private finance
can be seen in figure 3, which shows the types of financial flows that have been directed to the
developing world from 1990—2016. While private finance to developing economies has
significantly declined in 2002 and then again in 2008, it resurged significantly in late 2008. The
chart highlights how the taxonomy of development finance gradually made a shift from
traditional sources of financing—public sector and multilateral loans—to one where private
investment and foreign direct investment (FDI) now dominate financial flows to developing
economies. In fact, in the years 2008—2016, private investing from both corporations and
institutional investors represented over 80 percent of international financial flows in long-term
investment projects within developing countries (Runde, Savoy, and Miller 2018). This
correlates with a growing trend among investors who—provided with a low-interest rate
environment and improved long-term returns—are increasingly seeking to reorient their
investment horizons and commitments to alternative assets, such as in real estate and
infrastructure (Bielenberg et al. 2016).

Figure 3. Financial Flows to the Developing World 1990—2016
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Source: Ratha et al. (2016)

A recent UN report argues that financing a sustainable development agenda will
significantly require leadership and financial support from private sector sources, mainly from
institutional investors (UNEP 2017). There are usually six types of institutional investors:
sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), investment companies, insurance companies, pension funds,
mutual funds, and endowment funds. As of 2017, these investors carried 31 percent of the
global assets under management (AUM), a value of nearly $100 trillion and accounted for
around 70 percent trade volume in the public markets on any given day (Tyson 2018). These
firms are often less regulated because it is assumed that they are more knowledgeable and able
to protect themselves better than traditional banks.
Gnomes (2008) explains that these investors have less regulatory constraints and tend to
have long-term investment horizons. Essentially, just redirecting even just a small percentage of
their portfolios toward sustainable infrastructure will make a massive impact. Therefore,
institutional investment in developing economies makes economic sense for numerous reasons.
Mainly, with their large pools of managed capital, highly trained financial experts, and
relatively longer-term investment horizons are the characteristics that make institutional
investors critical to financing low-carbon infrastructure and filling sustainable funding gaps. A
recent McKinsey (2016) study estimated that institutional investors currently finance $300
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billion to $400 billion of infrastructure a year, but with right incentives, it is plausible private
institutional investment in infrastructure could increase by $1 trillion to $1.5 trillion per year
over the next 15 years. The study concluded that institutional investors can close over a third of
the $3.3 trillion infrastructure financing gap (Bielenberg et al. 2016). Capape (2018) explains
that a proper sustainable financing framework should focus on strategically mobilizing the over
$100 trillion in assets that are in the hands of institutional investors toward more sustainable and
productive investments.
For many investors applying sustainable infrastructure assets as part of their long-term
portfolio strategy is growing in popularity and suggests that these investors will play a more
proactive role in sustainable finance in the future. First, many investors are moving into direct
infrastructure projects rather than in public markets. This gives investors more of a say in the
early stages of these infrastructure projects rather than as limited stakeholders, and it also allows
them to receive higher returns. Second, moving into unlisted private markets allows investors to
diversify their assets and optimize their portfolio strategies. Third, the growing interest in
responsible and impact investing that incorporates sustainable factors into investments has
shown investors that sustainable assets are a better way to reduce risks and identify
opportunities for future growth. Finally, due to these previous three factors, funds are setting
more aggressive portfolio target both for infrastructure and for sustainability. Since the
establishment of the 2030 Agenda, investors have been more eager to match their long-term
debt with relatively low-volatile and long-term sustainable liabilities while optimizing proactive
investment strategies. In fact, in a survey of 115 private investors, 67 percent said they are
planning to increase infrastructure investment in the next few years (Bielenberg et al. 2016).
There is otherwise a definite disconnect between the investors with substantially capital and
sustainable projects in developing economies that need financing. The problem is that the
existing financial framework has been inefficient at matching private sector capital to illiquid
long-term assets related to sustainable infrastructure. Therefore, the major impediment to filling
the infrastructure financing gap is aligning the large pool of private sector capital from
institutional investors with investable projects. Increasingly governments will have to design
policies that attract more private capital, whereas private investors should be seeking projects
where they can have the most impact.
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Investors should consider that developing economies offer many strategic advantages.
First, infrastructure demands are increasing, and it is estimated that by 2030, developing regions
will account for 97 percent of the world’s population growth of 1.2 billion people (UNCTAD
2018). This massive surge in population and resource demands creates a sense of urgency to
improve the quality and quantity of infrastructure in these economies. Meanwhile, the
establishment of the 2030 Agenda creates even further opportunities for investors who are
seeking sustainable investments. For example, Tyson (2018) predicts that achieving the SDGs
could open as much as $12 trillion of market investment opportunities. Second, the scale and
scope of forecasted economic demands apply further challenges to the world economy,
particularly in developing economies (Kharas and MacArthur 2014). Given the existing
constraints that governments face, private sector solutions are being increasingly utilized. For
example, investors could use, social impact investments, which are a combination of both
public, philanthropic, and private capital to help direct new capital flows into developing
economies (Ehlers 2014).
Third, the enormous expected economic growth rates needed to reach the SDGs in
developing countries presents major opportunities for institutional investors as these markets
mature. Since infrastructure is so important to economic development, investing in
infrastructure will allow private financers to associate themselves with the forecasted economic
and social growth rates in these countries, this is known as capital scalability. In turn, the proper
coordination of financing will have a positive impact on the long-term growth rates of
developing countries and have a greater impact on the least-developed countries, who are often
capital starved. Private investors could not only help provide demanded financing but also could
help ensure that projects run efficiently and smoothly (Ehlers 2014). For example, according to
the Istanbul Program of Action for the Least Developed Countries (IPALDC) (2015), the
construction of proper sustainable infrastructure can help emerging and developing nations
reach the 7 percent annual economic growth rate needed to achieve the SDGs by 2030. Helping
nations reach their sustainable development goals will allow investors to benefit from the
enormous growth rates in these economies and enhance their prospects of obtaining higher rates
of returns over the long-term lifecycle of the project than in developed nations.
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Additionally, as the capital markets in developing countries mature, they will become
more attractive for two reasons: existing projects will expand opportunities for new
collaborative investment and business partnerships; the deepening of capital in these economies
creates more liquid assets, investment scalability, and improves productivity (Bouri 2018). For
one, the infusion of private capital enables governments to free up additional resources and
focus on other development initiatives (Woetzel et al. 2017). These features all correspond with
positive economic growth and greater societal improvement.

What is Limiting Private Sector Engagement in Developing Economies?
While there have been some improvements made, most institutional investors allocate very few
resources and capital towards sustainable investments, especially in developing economies. In
2017, the portfolio allocation of institutional capital to sustainable infrastructure remained low,
at around 1 percent by institutional investors globally (Belienberg et al. 2018).
Carter (2015) highlights the three main constraints that institutional investors face when
seeking to allocate resources into developing economies: technical constraints, investment
barriers, and legal requirements. First, developing economies which suffer from weak
governance and inadequate financial resources, often have difficult times in creating long-term
strategic plans for infrastructure investment. These technical constraints create additional
worries for investors seeking to allocate funds in these economies, as they can run into
logistical, technological, or project assurance issues. Moreover, the lack of transparency be the
project, and the private capital can threaten the overall success of the infrastructure projects
(Egler and Frazao 2016).
Second, even if some governments manage to develop strategic infrastructure plans, the
implementation of these strategies may not be adequately coordinated with investors or with
other actors involved. Specifically, developing economies face restrictions and lack
administrative resources. The insufficient amount of administrative resources limits their
government’s ability to offer enough incentives to help mitigate the risks of infrastructure
projects for foreign investors and limits investor capacity to devote capital towards these
economies. Investors seeking to invest in these economies, often face issues with lack of
bankable projects, transparency issues, and unfavorable regulations coupled with poor business
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policy. As such, within many developing economies, there are still multiple barriers that exist in
mobilizing transformative levels of financing.
Finally, based on the lack of knowledge and uncertainty in these markets, it is hard for
investors to analyze the long-term risk-adjusted returns for uncertain investments. Without the
proper tools for investment dissemination, it makes it difficult for investors to justify investing
in infrastructure projects and is even more challenging to analyze sustainable infrastructure
projects. Given that the enormous initial costs and the uncertainty of these illiquid long-term
assets, at times, investors seeking the optimal value of their initial expenditure, find it hard to
predict the projects outcome and long-term returns. On the other hand, governments may
impose legal constraints on investors who are suspected of planning perverse investments or
trying to obtain strategic domestic resources from host nations. Thus, without long-term
strategic plans to guide investors through the tedious planning processes associated with
infrastructure projects, then achieving financing in these assets will be limited.

Institutional Investors and Investing in Sustainable Economy
Anderson and Chonghaile (2015) note that in the coming decades, private finance and
institutional investors must be adaptable and collaborate with governments, international
financial organizations, and conventional financers to expand opportunities in low-carbon
investments in developing economies. While there are inherent risks associated with these
strategies, in the next decade and after that, there will be numerous opportunities for investors,
fund stakeholders, and for corporations who are willing to commit long-term capital to these
regions. These new opportunities can provide investors incredible advantages, ranging from
obtaining access to high growth markets, portfolio optimization/diversification, and obtaining
valuable capital assets unrelated to their public market assets.
Considering this, institutional investors also have a higher capacity to influence
sustainable development in these economies, as they can leapfrog traditional energy and
pollution-heavy stages in development and invest directly into green infrastructure technology
(Tyson 2018). Not only will annual investment in infrastructure have to increase, but
institutional investors should realign their portfolio allocation choices and support sustainable
infrastructure in developing economies. This supports Runde, Savoy, and Milner (2018) that
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‘green’ growth in the economy cannot be maintained without the expansion of infrastructure
financing and the reallocation of investments to long-term low-carbon assets. At present, much
of the current private sector flows to infrastructure are into the traditional brownfield,
nonrenewable, and fossil fuel-based projects, and as noted, most of these projects are focused in
advanced economies. Whereas, only a small fraction of total private debt and equity financing is
directed toward green investments, such as low-carbon infrastructure or in clean energy
resources.
To meet the demands of a changing economy, investment managers should consider the
scalability of sustainable infrastructure and be proactive about implementing SDG-related assets
into their portfolios. As noted by Amin and Lockridge (2017), institutional investors can make a
significant impact on the SDGs, just by focusing their mandates towards sustainable assets and
their mandates to more long-term horizons. They recommend that private investors, including
banks and institutional investors, shift the composition of their portfolios by 30 percent away
traditional brown-field projects into more low-carbon infrastructure. For example, if current
investors increased their annual portfolio allocations to 6 percent, it would add over $150 billion
into sustainable assets annually. Investors seeking to optimize low-carbon investment strategies
should consider the long-term gains in sustainable assets, especially since countries are aiming
to decrease carbon-emissions in accordance with the Paris Agreement. They might recognize
that current high-carbon investments may get stranded as climate policy is strengthened and
traditional brown-field projects become obsolete. They should consider climate-risk concerns
and costs associated with climate change in their portfolios and apply that analysis to potential
investment projects.
The longer investors wait, the higher the chances are that transitioning into a green
economy will be rendered as costs surmount and become unfeasible to achieve. Altogether, the
additional costs to ensure that infrastructure meets sustainability standards and the initial upfront
burden of sustainable assets could add $14 trillion to overall infrastructure costs and value
between 2015 to 2030. However, according to Bielenberg et al. (2016), much of the cost will be
offset by a $9.4 trillion financing reduction in fossil fuels exploration, energy transmission
development, and the distribution of the nonrenewable supply chain. Furthermore, if the
operational savings of the sustainable infrastructure is accounted for, then a low-carbon scenario
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of infrastructure development over the next decade will be around $1 trillion cheaper than in
traditional fossil-fuel reliant infrastructure. Some estimates predict that out of every additional
dollar invested today in clean energy, will save three dollars in future fuel costs by 2050
(Kaminker et al. 2013).

Shifting Investor Behavior
In the coming decades, it is imperative that private financial entities realize the potential that
these SDGs present, and it is equally important that investors shift resources to developing
economies where capital could be more productive (Curto 2010). The adaptability of these
investors could help make up for the deficiencies within the existing capital architecture and
help catalyze new development efforts in emerging economies. It has also been shown that
efforts to incorporate smaller economies, such as the least developed economies, in portfolio
decisions improves the outcome of many social and economic targets globally while at the same
time enhance portfolio efficiency (UNCTAD 2018).
For investors allocating more capital to long-term infrastructure in developing countries
is a strategic way to diversify assets away from equities and bonds in advanced economies,
while gaining valuable access to new markets. By that same measure, in recent years, private
financial flows have shown improvements in long-term sustainable initiatives. Since 2010
investments in renewable energy have increased from $45 billion to $270 billion (Voysey,
Stacey, and Allison 2016). Examples include wind and solar power plants, hydroelectric dams,
and the expanding electric car charging infrastructure. Just in 2015, more than 400 private sector
investors with $25 trillion in assets have committed to increasing low-carbon and climate
resilient investments as part of the "Transition Pathway Initiative" established after the Paris
Agreement (Egler and Frazao 2015). Many of these same institutional investors committed to
clean energy and decarbonized portfolios. In fact, a recent PWC survey (2017) showed that 71
percent of private investors say they are already planning how they will engage with the SDGs
in economies that need it the most (Baker 2018). Another report published by Bouri et al. (2018)
found that 73 percent of investment leaders have stated their intent to integrate more sustainable
guidelines into their investment portfolios. In October 2016, nearly 1,500 private financial
institutions adopted the Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI), that outlined a common
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framework for investing in sustainable assets and help align investor strategies with the SDGs
(Amin and Lockridge 2017). That same year, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP)
Portfolio Decarbonization Coalition — a multi-stakeholder initiative that represents over 27
institutional investors with accumulative $3 trillion in assets under management—reported that
seventeen of the investors have now formally established decarbonization portfolio objectives
and had launched individual firm initiatives to tackle global warming (UNEP 2017).
This can be seen in figure 4 that since 2013, there has been a spike in sustainable
development initiatives from— traditional commercial banks and institutional— private
investors (Amin and Lockridge 2017). As compared to traditional infrastructure initiatives, such
as nonrenewable energy projects, sustainable infrastructure initiatives nearly tripled them in
2016. In fact, Tyson (2018) notes that 40 percent of new private infrastructure investment went
into renewables in 2016. This spike correlates with the renewed interest in green financing since
the establishment of the 2030 Agenda, along with the significant increases in governments' and
investors' ability to build more "bankable projects" and create more sustainable communities
(Amin and Lockridge 2017). Furthermore, the renewed interest in sustainable infrastructure
correlates with the assumption by many investors that renewable energy assets hold their value
and provide long-term cash flow to investors (Amin and Lockridge 2017). In addition, many of
these investors are increasingly recognizing that an energy transition is underway and are
unwilling to invest in traditional infrastructure assets, due to concerns about "stranded assets,"
or assets that will not be demanded over the long-term and will significantly lose their value
with time (Amin and Lockridge 2017). According to Bielenberg et al. (2016), private
investment has been fundamental in helping overcome the financing gap in sustainable
infrastructure and will continue to do so in the next century.
Figure 4. Growth in Sustainable Infrastructure Initiatives 1999 – 2016
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Source: Amin and Lockridge (2017)

IV. THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND THE PUBLIC SECTOR
As is with most investors, institutional investors main priority is to return material value in the
form of profits to their shareholders and improve quarterly earnings. As such, they will only
shift their fund composition to low-carbon assets when their forecasted returns are competitive
against traditional assets (Kaminker et al. 2013). While there have been significant
improvements, in many cases, weak green asset returns in developing economies are a
consequence of an insufficient public investment in the preparation stages of long-term
infrastructure projects that optimize carbon-saving technologies. Considering that sustainable
projects often have high initial costs, investors search for projects that offer the right amount of
technical assistance, financial incentives, and monetary support from government authorities to
ensure their capital is efficiently used. Without the assurance of government cooperation,
investors face further difficulties in understanding all the risks associated with these projects.
These asymmetries have caused investors to hesitate to reallocate assets to sustainable sectors in
developing economies. It is easier for them investors employ financing to stable existing
infrastructure in developed economies rather than to new economic projects in developing
economies. Bielenberg et al. (2016) maintain that investors may be willing to take on
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sustainable infrastructure but want higher returns to compensate them for their perceived risks.
This follows the conclusion of the CEO of the New Zealand Superfund Adrian Orr who in a
recent interview concluded that sustainable infrastructure opens up other valuable business
propositions within the existing infrastructure network, but he recognized that “certain
investment activities may be comfortable and quite scalable, with similar resource needs, but
others may not” (Beilenberg et al. 2016).
Hans Peter Egler and Raul Frazao (2016) recognize that these problems stem from the
existing policy landscape within the current financial structure and macroeconomic objectives
operate. To address these issues requires reinvigorating the risk and accountability aspects of
these investor mandates to include SDG-related assets. While at the same time, governments
and legislative authorities should aim to resolve some of the structural and policy issues, which
are limiting investors from allocating resources in their economies. Therefore, in order to
transition into a low-carbon society and increase sustainable infrastructure investment, it must
be an initiative of all stakeholders, including both public and private actors, within both
developing and developed nations (Egler and Frazao 2016).

Investment Strategy and Integrating ESG Assets
Given the unprecedented ambitions and opportunities presented to investors and developing
economies, it is essential that each explore new investment partnerships and reiterate strategies
that will lead to a more dynamic and sustainable economy. However, there is still is a genuine
policy shift that will need to take place from both the external political framework and the
internal management of investment institutions, as well as government bureaucracies and
community organizations. Such initiatives should promote enhanced asset transparency, ethical
management practices, and allow stakeholders to apply pressure on the fund managers to build
stronger internal sustainable investment capacities (Capape 2018). Therefore, a balance must be
struck between policymakers and influential private investors as well as the communities that
they impact.
On the private sector side, the climate-related risks that impact our world today and in
the coming decades are too far-reaching for financial institutions to avoid entirely. If progress is
to be made on sustainable development, firms will have to reallocate new capital flows and re-
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route existing portfolio capital into sustainable assets. These challenges present material benefits
for benevolent firms who invest in infrastructure, housing, energy, private equity, and
innovation sectors and other long-term financing strategies (Sharma 2018). By forging
relationships with governments and international policymakers, investors can manage their
financial agenda goals and align their strategies with the SDGs. Klemper and Tarnoswki (2017)
explain that this new style of managing relationships is what authors have called hybrid
organizing, a management approach that involves building and maintaining social and financial
goals, structuring the organization around those goals, and training managers to support
community relationships and foster business partnership around those goals. When the social
and financial goals come into conflict, it is the financial manager's job to make the difficult
trade-offs to keep the goals in equilibrium. Hybrid investing is just one strategy that investors
can use to ensure they are making impactful investments and allocating adequate resources to
society.
In other words, the 2030 SDGs signifies that responsible investment stewardship must
guide development strategies and capital flows. This is important when transitioning to a
sustainable economy because there does not have to be a trade-off between economic prosperity
and environmental preservation (Baker 2018). As such, investors need to go beyond ‘cherrypicking’ the sustainable goals which are the easiest to achieve and instead take more of a
holistic approach to investing, by integrating the ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance)
criteria into their core management operations (Sharma 2018). The ESG criteria, Capape (2018)
explains is fundamental to progress because it outlines a set of investment standards which are
subjected to the principles that adhere to strict ethical and transparent investing practices. Pandit
and Tamhane (2018) highlight that the environmental principle stands for proper stewardship of
the economy. The social criteria examine how companies manage the relationships with their
workforce, customers, and the communities it operates. Whereas, the governance part deals with
the leadership and management of the company and its investments.
In an increasingly financial and socially interconnected world, the importance of actively
managing risks and opportunities related to emerging environmental and economic trends is
becoming increasingly complex. Since institutional managers are self-interested, they are
motivated to improve their portfolio performance and increases capital gains to their
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shareholders. As such, corresponding to the rise in institutional ownership in large companies
in the 1970s, many investors had developed innovative methods to embrace the demand of their
stakeholders, optimize investment strategies, and improve their portfolio performance.
One method investors use is stakeholder engagement. In context, stakeholder
engagement explains the relationship between the principles and values of a firm and the
decisions of the executives who manage the firm (Jung and Dobbin 2012). Adolf Augustus
Berle and Gardiner Coit Means (1932) discussed corporate governance in terms of an “agent”
and a “principle.” The shareholders are the principles who own the corporation, whereas the
managers of the corporation act as the agent. The relationships which coordinate corporate
governance according to Berle and Means (1932) is known as the principle-agent relationship.
As such, the principle-agent relationships refers to the relationships between the shareholders—I
refer to the stakeholders—and the management personnel. At times, the principle demands may
conflict with the agent's corporate practices, and it is hard to distinguish whether these managers
(agents) are performing for themselves or the owners (principles) of the company (Mizurchi
2004). Under stakeholder engagement investors, "the principles" can promote more efficient
corporative governance using institutional financing and investor influence. In theory, the firms
must not only serve their shareholder interests but now have a responsibility to serve their
stakeholder's conditions, this being private and institutional investors. These institutional
investors, for example, can use stakeholder power to enhance pressure on the decision-making
processes of the firms or projects they invest in (Mather 2017).
The consequence of investor pressure is that the profit-seeking motivates of investors
can lead to conflicts between a company’s corporate mission and ethical management practices
while also having to meet the demands of their stakeholders (Mizurchi 2004). Consequently,
irresponsible stewardship among investors can create issues in managing investments,
coordinating strategies, and incoherence in the corporate power structure. Failure to align the
two opposing forces of the ‘principle' and the ‘agent' can result in principle-agent problems and
can create discord within companies and divestiture among shareholders. Principle–agents’
problems can result in several issues that can increase agency costs, which arise in the wake of
core management inefficiencies, relationship dissatisfactions, and disruption between agents and
the principles (Mizurchi 2004). Stakeholder power can aid in resolving the problems that can
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exist when company values do not align with investor demands or their appetite for risks. Such
practices like stakeholder power provide institutional investment managers with higher returns
and enhanced ability to influence business and investment outcomes.
Indeed, the rise in institutional investing allows investors to have greater capacity to
influence corporate investment decisions and promote a more sustainable economy, through
stakeholder power (Jung and Dobbin 2012). Many private businesses and institutional investors
are already contributing to the SDGs through a variety of factors (Mather 2017). One-way
investment actors are contributing to the SDG agenda is by applying an ESG criteria to
companies and organizations they seek to invest in. Applying an ESG criteria allows socially
conscious investors to form investment decisions around a value or principle related framework,
and to screen the mitigation, and implementation processes (Pandit and Tamhane 2018). The
SDG agenda includes the promotion of investment in sustainable infrastructure, agriculture,
industrialization, science, technology, and innovation (Guerin 2013). Luckily, these positive
sustainable themes resonate well with the investment mandates of many institutional investors.
As such, investors who want to support sustainable development, can use an ESG criteria to
identify sustainable and impact products. Many institutional investors have been aggressively
applying an ESG criteria to their investment decisions and management practices, since the
establishment of the SDGs. Pal (2018) explains this growing interest in using an ESG criteria
“in a sense the SDGs are a rallying theme for asset managers, corporations, and other
institutions to align their business values to, so that capital is allocated towards positive impact
investments.” Based on this premise, more and more investors have expressed to their
shareholders their commitment to be responsible fiduciaries by employing sustainable standards
and to be more active in promoting investments that aim to preserve our planet (PRI 2018).
In the twenty-first century, enabling the use of stakeholder power could help investors
and corporations reach their SDGs objectives. Additionally, by using stakeholder power,
corporations and shareholders can adjust company objects to meet the public demands for
improved accountability and corporate governance. Otherwise, through stakeholder pressure,
investors can also use the ESG criteria to help identify investments and corporations which are
in the best position to deliver substantial long-term financial value while also addressing the
most societal goals (Mather 2017). Thus, with the application of ESG investments, a new stage
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has been set in investment portfolio allocation and asset management practices. At present,
according to Pandit and Tamhane (2018), most institutional investors integrate ESG criteria to
investments, have active ESG managers, and initiate climate risks into their portfolio concerns.
On a global basis, a recent study by Royal Bank of Canada (2017) showed that 72 percent of
institutional investors are using ESG principles as part of their investment approach (Pandit and
Tamhane 2018). Due to the interest in the SDGs from the investment community, vital
sustainable products and assets increasingly receive financing. In fact, the Business and
Sustainable Development (BSD) report (2017) estimated that by 2030, there could be 380
million new jobs established which focus on maintaining the SDG agenda. The report also
concluded that for many investors, their ESG assets would outperform their non-ESG assets in
the next year, and for the years to come.
As such, the financial industry has been very successful at integrating sustainable ESG
products into their portfolios, and their attitude to responsible investing has been positive for
SDG-related assets. In a recent survey, Bouri et al. (2018) found that 42 percent of institutional
investors reported that they are aggressively applying socially responsible criteria to their
impact investment measurements. According to Pandit and Tamhane (2018), the activity of
screening investments under a socially conscious framework is a growing field, known as
impact investing, sometimes called socially responsible investing. In particular, impact investing
is the ability for investors to apply a socially responsible framework to capital investment
projects, which have social or environmental benefits. Throughout the world, asset managers
and institutional investors are increasingly adopting the SDG agenda and ESG criteria as a
framework to measure the positive impacts in their portfolios (Pal 2018). Figure 5 provides an
overview of the progression of impact investing in the last few years. As shown, in just in 2013
impact investing only accounted for around $50 billion of assets under management, in just four
years, that sum increased to $225 Billion of assets under management.
Figure 5. Impact Investing Assets Under Management 2013 – 2017
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Although the field of impact investing is still evolving, using ESG principles represents
a significant shift in investment choice and asset allocation in financial markets. Indeed, impact
investing has driven more capital flows towards investments which provide critical solutions to
the environmental and social challenges facing the world today (Bielenberg et al. 2016). Now
many assets managers and investors cite that there are zero barriers in enhancing or improving
their ESG financing commitments (Capape 2018). As noted by a 2017 McKinsey Report,
“impact investing has already made accelerating improvements on the sustainable goals”
(Bielenberg et al. 2016). The report mentions that the "sustainable assets that meet the ESG
criteria have increased to 26 percent of the entire managed asset classes in the last few years.” In
2016, a survey conducted by State Street found that ESG investing encompassed $22.9 trillion
in total asset under management, which is just over a quarter of the worlds professionally
managed assets (Capape 2018). More importantly, over 45 percent of those impact investments
happen in emerging markets and the least-developed economies.
The growing trend of impact investing is becoming a standard in investment and
financial management practices. These trends have spawned industrial initiatives, such as the
European Association of Long-Term Investors who in 2016, recognized the importance of the
physical, economic, and financial risks associated with climate change as well as the growing
opportunities that low-carbon economic transition presents for new investments and jobs (Pandit
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and Tamhane 2018). Even more surprising is that the Global Impact Investing Network (Bouri
et al. 2018) reported in 2016, that over $77.4 billion is currently being invested in impact
investments in about 403 funds and financial products around in the world. According to a 2017
report conducted by East & Partners, “Sustainable Financing and ESG Investing,” found that 84
percent of European Investors, 58.1 percent of American Investors, and 40 percent of Asian
Investors had an ESG strategy in place (Pielichata 2018). Almost 75 percent of these asset
managers in 2017, agreed that low-carbon investments are among the most important long-term
financing trends in their portfolios The Principles for Responsible Investment, states “that 99
percent of French asset owners are addressing climate change issues in their portfolios” (PRI
2018). Furthermore, over 60 percent of managers are directly engaging with companies to act on
climate change (PRI 2018). Also, 20 percent of institutional investors globally have private fund
managers that solely focus on sustainable investing. The point is, impact investing has
drastically changed investor attitudes about ESG assets and revitalized sustainable financing.
Since individual institutions bear ultimate responsibility for managing climate-related
risks on behalf of their clients and their shareholders, the application of impact investing has
created both industrial and social movements. The industry movement has developed because
institutional investors have increasingly pledged to decarbonize their investment portfolios, align
strategically with SDG assets, and continued to develop analyzation methods to assess their
carbon footprint (Bouri et al. 2018). The social movement was due to the prorogated access to
climate-risk information, the new holistic approaches to business and government practices, and
a fundamental behavioral change that has shifted how societies and individuals make economic
choices. These movements have been able to motivate companies and investors to realize that
impact investments are good for business and very profitable. The success of impact investments
in the past shows that such investment practices will become the norm in investment
management and portfolio strategies as the market begins its long transition process to a more
sustainable and inclusive economy (Pielichata 2018). In the long-run, investors who anticipate
and invest in market responses to climate change now will benefit the most, as the saying goes,
"the earlier bird gets the worm." As the CEO of Blackrock, Larry Flink, once said, "that society
is demanding that companies, both public and private, serve a social purpose. Companies must
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not only deliver financial performance but also show how they make a positive contribution to
society" (Pal 2018).

Building an Attractive Regulatory Framework
On the other hand, given the amount of infrastructure required, it falls on the responsibility of
the government and administrators to provide a proper framework for adaptation planning,
project guidance, and incentives to attract investment into sustainable assets from traditional as
well as alternative financing entities (Baker 2018). Indeed, there are many ways in which host
countries might go about obtaining private sector finance, either in isolation, working directly
with the investor, or working with other governments and international organizations. Either
way, governments, and their international development colleagues must create the right
conditions for private–sector infrastructure development and green investment. They need to
ensure a policy environment which improves accessibility and transparency to green assets
while conditionally lowering the long-term uncertainty faced by many investors. In line with
this view, “The 2017 SDG Investment Guide” stated that failure to provide efficient and
effective sustainable guidelines for investments and investors would weaken our capacity to
achieve greater prosperity in the future for all (PRI 2017).
Essentially, governments and policymakers can further facilitate private sector
infrastructure financing in three ways. First, governments should focus on investing in the
preparational stages of projects, facilities, and with the labor force which will inherently
improve the bankability of the sustainable project pipeline (Bielenberg et al. 2016). The
improvements in low-carbon bankable infrastructure assets present tremendous opportunities for
the community of long-term private investors because such assets offer high economies of scale,
inelastic demand, and stable cash flows (Clark et al. 2011). The number of bankable projects is
significant because investors are actively searching for private and public partners to help
mobilize capital into new uncertain economies. Therefore, the more bankable projects that a
country establishes will help improved all social indicators and their overall economic profile.
The problem is that, according to Bielenberg et al. (2016) that bankable sustainable projects in
developing economies are basically nonexistent. This follows Havard Halland (2017) of the
World Bank, who said, "there is simply not enough viable projects out there." Additionally,
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many infrastructure projects in developing economies, especially sustainable infrastructure
projects, are not profitable enough to attract private capital (Bielenberg et al. 2016).
According to Runde, Savoy, and Miller (2018) in order to improve the bankable pipeline
and capital guidance, governments can facilitate external and internal capital flows with private
and institutional investors to take advantage of growth-enhancing investments.
This can be achieved when governments in developing economies improve domestic resource
mobilization, mainly by increasing tax collection, anti-corruption campaigns, and in obtaining
international public finance. Additional by working with intergovernmental financing
organizations and multilateral development banks, governments can utilize external capital to
invest in the preparation and the long-term stages of infrastructure projects to reduce the
projects costs and implementation period. Likewise, in an era defined by low-interest rates,
strong macroeconomic growth, and innovative methods of financing, developing economies
have the perfect opportunity to build efficient and effective sustainable frameworks. Also, as
SDG assets become more profitable and align with institutional mandates, investors will begin
to shift their strategies and to be more suitable in financing activities related to SDGs (Sharma
2018).
Second, economic and climate policy action must continue to adapt and address the
misalignments between investors and sustainability initiatives. The lessons of history continue
to prove that it is the responsibility of the policymakers and intermediaries in creating rules that
facilitate financing for development. A stable and predictable regulatory policy environment and
governance framework can attract investors and enhance capital expenditure (Schmidt -Traub,
2015). Building practical and transparent standards that enable governments to mitigate and
reduce the risk of investments is increasingly important, and without such policies, investors and
governments will remain hesitant about private capital expansion. This is primarily a concern
for developing economies since they face additional financial challenges, such as corruption, a
fragile policy framework, and the lack of capital development (Lipton 2015). Governments
should establish a common language through policy concerning the SDGs and more broadly, the
ESG initiatives that intend to accelerate further private capital in sustainable sectors. Getting
this right could unleash tremendous amounts of liquid capital support to the developing
economies (Mather 2017).
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Third, the international community must play a more significant role, whether through
developing new initiatives that complement the measuring and the efficiency of sustainable
infrastructure projects or by offering guidance to governments in energy policy. For example,
the establishment of many green collaborative initiatives, such as the development of specific
task forces for institutional investors, like the Global Impact Investing Network (GIIN), the
International Institute for Sustainability Development, and the establishment of the One Planet
Summit, has already enhanced pressure on investors to reiterate common investment priorities
relating to the SDGs (Guerin 2013). Other projects include the annually “SDG Index and
Dashboard” report which shows specific quantitative variables that express the progress being
made by countries who are adopting SDG indicators and who are promoting sustainable
infrastructure projects (Mather 2017). The OECD (2014) also offers solutions through
monitoring procedures to help tackle the new and diverse infrastructure challenges arising
within ESG principled assets and sustainable strategies. While all these efforts are ways to
improve transparency standards at the international level and make green investments
opportunities more accessible to investors, much more work is needed to build a practical and
comprehensive sustainable framework.
Finally, initiating more sustainable regulations would reduce systemic risks in assets and
within the investments that correlate with the SDGs (Sharma 2018). Conversely, regulation and
policy implementation must be clear, concise, and quick or as a global community, we risk
dismal failure at designing climate framework the is efficient. As of 2017, there were nearly 300
new ESG related regulations aimed at the investment industry worldwide. Just in the EU alone,
the IORP II Directive was established in 2015 by the EU commission designed to enforce new
legal requirements of institutional investors who are considering ESGs in their portfolios
(Woetzel et al. 2017). Other global regulators are putting much focus on sustainable regulations
and implementing ESG criteria into a new law. As Graeme Griffiths (PRI 2017) said, "many
institutions find regulations to be ineffective, owing to different interpretations in different
markets. However, research we have done suggests that regulation does have a positive effect
on levels of disclosure and increase awareness.” Thus, financing sustainable development and
meeting the post-2015 agenda will require policy flexibility and enhanced regulatory financial
strategy, especially within developing economies.
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On the other hand, regulators will have an uphill battle to climb, as they will have a
diminished capacity to identify, understand, and address the rise of enormous complexities of
economic shareholders. Many of these regulators who are dedicated to financing a decarbonized
economy are consistently strained and weakened by individual and national interests. In fact, in
many developing countries progress on the SDGs has been consistently slow and even regressed
in some fragile economies (OECD 2014).
To summarize a major source in achieving financing in developing countries will be
from private market financial sources, but only if government policy aligns with an attractive
financing framework. While these SDGs are global economic and social goals, their
implementation will most effectively be driven at the regional, national, and local levels
(UNCTAD 2018). Indeed, governments have a significant role to play in matching institutional
capital to domestic SDG assets and in designing public investments to attract private funding.
Hence, political and financial structural reforms are needed to ensure that investment is being
facilitated to essential services in society (Sharma 2018). Furthermore, Kharas and McArthur
(2014), mention that governments will need to promote incentives for innovation and provide a
stable regulatory environment that allows investors to mitigate risks over the long-term, thus
enabling them to take positions on assets which are in line with the SDGs. According to Lagarde
(2016), to attract external investment, emerging and developing countries can strengthen their
institutional frameworks, protect trade integration, and permit exchange rate flexibility. For the
least–developed economies, it is essential to push for more progressive development of their
capital markets and design policies that aim at increasing their long-term growth (Woetzel et al.
2017). In that same matter, these should use macroprudential tools to limit financial sector risks;
these include monitoring foreign currency debt and limiting large credit and debt expansions to
protect against capital flight.
Additionally, developing and emerging economies can learn from socially conscious
developed nations that have designed institutional policies to combat climate change.
Movements in countries like Norway, Canada, France, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and in
other markets encouraging institutional investors to become leaders and stewards in this new
economy and to the shareholders, they represent (Capape and Santivanez 2017). For example,
Capape (2018) mentions that the United Kingdom’s Climate Change Act of 2008, Sweden’s
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Sustainable agenda, and Frances Energy Transition for Green Growth Act in 2015 creates
investment strategies in sustainability via legislation that should be mirrored by others. In the
end, developed and developing countries and institutional investors must continue to work
together to boost potential growth and help each other in allocating capital towards more
sustainable resources and opportunities. Together multinational firms, investors, and
governments must have the courage to strike out in new directions and trailblaze a path for
others to follow.

V. THE IMPORTANCE OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS AND THEIR ROLE IN
TRANSITIONING TO A SUSTAINABLE ECONOMY
As stated, institutional investors have a tremendous capacity to fulfill the funding gap in the
SDGs and be impactful participants in a sustainable economy. While most institutional investors
have long-term investment outlooks, the characteristics of these each investor are often quite
different. For example, hedge funds are more interested, pump and dump, or pyramid schemes
and do not mind take on more risks to improve gains (Bienlenberg et al. 2016). Whereas, other
investors have conservative asset allocation strategies and stick with bonds and equities. The
point here is that certain investors have characteristics which inherently enables them to
maintain high risks capacities and optimize long-term investment strategies. Considering that
alternative assets, such as sustainable infrastructure, require long-term financing commitments,
it is crucial to optimize the most efficient investor for each of long-term infrastructure project.
Though many types of investors can play an important role in supporting the SDGs, some
investors have general qualities that make them better for the job.
One type of institutional investor who has recently received increasing media, political,
and corporate attention is Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs). SWFs are known to act as longterm investors and often take positions on more illiquid foreign assets, particularly
infrastructure, real estate, etc. (Gnomes 2008). In many cases, the investment mandates and
portfolio strategies of SWFs often align well with these assets. Furthermore, SWFs are not
burdened by the same cumbersome regulations and financial requirements that traditional
commercial banks face. Given the significant financing gaps in sustainable infrastructure and
50

regulatory constraints in the financial markets means that SWFs will be increasingly important
in the coming decades. Therefore, the characteristics of SWFs makes them potentially the most
adaptable and stable candidates for funding a sustainable economy.
SWFs are different from other institutional investors (i.e., mutual, pension, and hedge
funds) because they are not only large but also politically connected. For this reason, many cite
concerns about the purpose of SWFs and their often-vague objectives (Jeyaretnam 2009). SWFs
are technically state-owned investment funds and can be termed as financial arrangements
composed of financial assets, such as private equity, stocks, bonds, precious metals or other
financial instruments and products (Gnomes 2008). Consequently, Gnomes (2008) notes that
SWFs are a heterogeneous group, and their role may evolve, as societal and economic variables
change overtime. Basically, according to the Jeyaretnam (2009) “SWF are government
investment vehicles funded by trade surpluses or foreign exchange assets and managed
separately from official reserves.”
SWFs are inherently government-backed, have a low risk of insolvency, and usually
carry limited liabilities. The International Financial Services London (2009) describes these
funds as independent, increasingly active, and as having a higher risk of tolerance and longer
investment horizons than other institutional investors (Bienlenberg et al. 2016). Nations often
establish SWFs to address a variety of macroeconomic objectives, manage excess revenues
more efficiently, and transfer wealth to future generations. The uniqueness of SWFs puts them
in a vital position to finance long-term infrastructure development and address the 2030
Agenda.
The International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IFSWF) (2017) distinguished five
different types of SWFs which are characterized by their asset allocation: stabilization funds are
designed to manage swings in commodity prices and promote capital stability; savings funds,
are designed to transfer wealth in the form of investment savings to future generations; reserve
investment corporations, were established to diversify excess reserve holdings to maximize riskadjusted returns; development funds, finance socio-economic projects and improve a country's
potential growth; and pension reserve funds, are financed via pensions contributions and are
intended to increase pension holdings (Buteica and Petrescu 2017). To give more of an
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explanation, table 1 lists the different types of SWFs, correlated with their purposes and gives
examples of the nations who manage these funds.

Table 1. Different Types of SWFs
Objective
Stabilization Fund

Savings Fund

Explanation

Examples

Support macroeconomic
stability through fiscal impact
management driven by commodity
resource price volatility
Preserve and grow the wealth
for future generations

Reserve Investment Fund

Invest excess reserves,
including risk management of
foreign exchange

Development Fund

Promote economic
development and diversification,
e.g. investment in infrastructure
agriculture or private equity
Save and invest surpluses that
will be used to finance future
retirement liabilities

Pension Reserve Fund

Mexico, Algeria, and Russia’s
Reserve Funds

Alberta Heritage Savings Trust
Fund, Abu Dhabi Investment
Authority, Oman State General
Reserve Fund, and Alaska
Permanent Fund
Saudi Arabian Monetary
Authority, State Administration of
Foreign Exchange of China, and
Hong Kong Monetary Authority
Saudi Arabia Public
Investment Fund, Ireland Strategic
Fund, and Morocco Ithmar Capital
Australia Future Fund, New
Zealand Superannuation Fund, and
Norway Government Pensions
Fund Global

Source: Curto (2010)

Historical Analysis of Sovereign Wealth Funds
State-controlled investment funds are not a new phenomenon nor a new idea. In fact, investment
funds controlled by the state or government apparatuses have been around since the nineteenth
century. Nevertheless, most state investment funds never were permanent fixtures of the
economy and ended when their objectives were completed. By contrast, contemporary SWFs
have vague objectives, strategically managed, and are intended to be permanent. Notably, the
first modern SWF, known as the Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA), was established in 1953
by the colonial government of Kuwait. The original, purpose of the KIA was to invest surplus
oil revenues and to reduce the country's alliance on a finite resource (Buteica and Petrescu
2017). Through the decades, the government of Kuwait also used the fund to engage in
international investing, manage existing assets, and to employ its accumulated foreign reserves
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in public and private capital markets. Over time, the KIA and other state-controlled funds have
been used to gain access to new markets, valuable material assets, and other financial resources.
Although, the KIA was perhaps the world’s SWF, the term Sovereign Wealth Fund did
not exist until 2005 in the article, “Who Holds the Wealth of Nations (2005)?” In this article,
Andrew Rozanov defines SWFs, “as a by-product of national budget surpluses, accumulated
over the years due to favorable macroeconomic, trade and fiscal positions, coupled with longterm budget planning and spending restraints” He explained the governments support their
SWFs via revenues surpluses arising from two principal sources: commodity or noncommodity.
The most recognized and popular type of SWF is commodity state funds, which
capitalize on the exports from natural commodities, such as revenues from oil or mineral exports
(Capape and Santivanez 2017). Nearly 60 percent of all SWFs are financed through energy
exports. Otherwise, commodity state funds, use external sources of financing mainly from
current account surpluses accumulated from commodity extractions (Jeyaretnam 2009; Curto
2010). Of these commodity-based funds, the most common source of funding is from oil
reserves, which corresponds to the fact that the largest SWFs are in oil-exporting nations (Clark
et al. 2011). In most cases, the main objective of a commodity SWF is to maximize returns,
lower systemic risks, and relieve the nation from sole dependence on one commodity, while at
the same time preserving wealth for future generations. Take the Abu Dhabi Investment
Authority (AIA) for example the founders of the small Gulf country, Sheikh Zayed and Sultan
Al Nahyan, in 1972 dreamed that the utilization of the fund could smooth out the disruptive
effects of a volatile oil market and to diversify the nation's trade surplus across a variety of lowrisk financial asset classes. The SWF specialists, Javier Capape and Marta Santivanez (2017),
the (AIA) was reported to be managing over $800 billion in assets and resources by 2016. Thus,
commodity state funds can be very lucrative and proactive long-term investors if countries can
manage them properly.
Non-commodity SWFs are mostly sourced from excess foreign currency reserves and
current account surpluses. These non-commodity funds were designed by nations—mostly in
Southern Asia—to manage foreign reserves and invest excess surpluses into international
markets (Al-Hassen et al. 2013). An excellent example of a non-commodity SWF is the
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Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GSIC), which manages the country's foreign
exchange reserves and reinserts its savings into long-term capital appreciated investments
(Sharma 2018). Pointing to the rise in the number non-commodity state funds, Abdullah AlHassen et al. (2013) shows that many South East Asian nations began building foreign exchange
reserves from trade surpluses in the late 1990s after the Asian Financial Crisis, to provide a
currency cushion so that they could better manage financial crisis's. The report notes that as of
2013 nearly two-thirds of all SWFs, were in Asia, subjected to the role of mitigating the effects
of currency volatility and managing foreign exchange surpluses.
Although, it is true that these state investment funds have existed for more than a
century, by the turn of the new millennia the number of investment funds controlled by states
had increased dramatically in both size and scope. In most cases, SWFs give governments, the
ability to manage national savings and trade surpluses, enable further capital flexibility, asset
diversification, improve portfolio returns, especially for economies that are heavily reliant on
material resources (Guerin 2013). Overtime SWF have become useful tools to manage public
finances and achieve macroeconomic stability (Guerin 2013). Whether these funds are used in
dynamic investing, asset diversification, or currency stabilization, having the ability to address
multiple socioeconomic goals has influenced many governments to establish their own SWF.
With that said, the growth of these funds has been staggering, in 2007, there were just forty
SWFs throughout the world, as of 2017 there were eighty–one (Capape and Santivanez 2017).
In that same year, the combined assets of these SWFs exceeded $8 trillion and is predicted to
grow to $15 trillion by 2020. There is otherwise no doubt that SWFs are significant players in
the global economy and have the potential to be leaders in the sustainable economy as well.
The graph below, figure 6 shows the largest SWFs by assets under management in 2017.
As shown, by assets under management the Government Pension Fund Global of Norway
(GPFG), often referred to as the Oil Fund manages about $1 trillion in accumulated assets is the
largest SWF. The fund was created in 1990 to give the Norwegian government the ability to
mitigate the volatility stemming from its dependency on the oil market and to preserve surplus
savings for future generations of Norwegians (Sun and Hesse 2009). The management of the
fund is partly managed by the Norges Bank government officials and by outside professional
money advisors (Guerin 2013). Over the years, the success of the Oil Fund and the appropriate
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management of trade surpluses have privileged Norway to become one of the wealthiest and
stable economies in the world. Furthermore, in 2017, the World Happiness Report ranked
Norway's as the Worlds happiness nations (Chokshi 2017). Essentially, the stability and security
that the fund allows has improved the livelihood of the Norwegian economy and society.

Figure 6. Largest Wealth Funds by Assets under Management in 2017
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Sovereign Wealth Funds Today
Nevertheless, the investment decision of SWFs makes them unique because they are linked to
the overall governmental economic objectives and organizational structure. Since SWFs are
technically owned by the citizens of that nation, the allocations these funds can be socially
determined and beneficial to the whole society. Therefore, the financial managers of SWFs have
the ability to promote a more dynamic and extensive economy through socially conscious
investing and stakeholder engagement (Guerin 2013). First, by transiting the substantial savings
accumulated in these funds, governments can direct capital toward more productive investments
via into emerging economies or new technologies (Jayaretnam 2009). Second, as long-term
investors with no obligation for future calls and with low risk of insolvency, SWFs can restore
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capital exhaustion and financial stability. Third, by allocating more capital in the private
markets, SWFs can help fill financing gaps in illiquid, long-term assets. Fourth, SWFs can add
diversity to global investments and socio-economic projects, which can offer greater market
efficiency and lower market volatility (Capape and Santivanez 2017).
In summary, SWFs can provide an idiosyncratic framework to achieve a variety of
socioeconomic goals, such as necessitate capital into inadequate markets, obtain a higher
capacity for financial stability, and transform wealth into investment savings for future
generations (Sun and Hesse 2009). As contrarian investors, SWFs can support global markets by
injecting capital in times of financial stress and capital withdrawal. Internally, Gnomes (2008)
asserts SWFs can even be used for several national objectives, such as debt repayment, funding
for development projects, and exchange rate interventions. In addition, SWFs can protect
nations from the effects of global financial contagion during economic downturns or so call
Dutch Disease6 (Gnomes 2008). Despite the reasons why nations establish SWFs, it is
undeniable that these government operated wealth funds are becoming increasingly essential
participants in the international monetary and financial system. There is no doubt that when
transitioning into a sustainable economy, SWFs will be an important financial player, as they
can supply liquidity to uncertain economies, support greener infrastructure projects, and reduce
systemic risks overtime.

Achieving Improved Management Performance and Greater Transparency
As SWFs seek greater opportunities in developing economies, their capital resources present
potential opportunities for both investors and economies receiving their foreign capital. Yet,
Curto (2010) explains that directing capital flows toward developing economies carries inherent
challenges for both the recipient nation and the investor. Prior to taking a position on a private
market asset, SWFs should be aware that private market strategies are limited because they
often incur higher risks and are burdened with information asymmetries (Guerin 2013). Host

6

Dutch Disease is primarily associated with the discovery of a natural resource, it is the negative occurrence when
there are significant increases in the value of a country's currency. It can decrease the price of competitiveness of
exports and increases imports. The term Dutch disease was coined by the Economist magazine in 1977, discussing
the crisis that occurred in the Netherlands after the discovery of oil in the North Sea.
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governments who receive SWF capital may face similar risks, such as information asymmetry’s,
lack of clarity in fund objectives, and poor capital management.
A decision to invest in an asset, whether in developed or developing economies, is
always a decision about the liability structure of the investor. Since each investor has different
objectives, and those objectives determine whether they can invest freely in long-term and into
illiquid investments, especially in uncertain markets (Sharma 2018). Due to their objectives,
SWFs differs widely in terms of investment strategy, transparency, disclosure of portfolio
information, and appetite for risks (Curto 2010). While the reasons vary, SWFs often hesitate to
take positions on infrastructure assets in developing economies in fear of increased exposure to
political and regulatorily risk (Sharma 2018). Other investors cite that small and developing
economies are often are based on weak governmental structures, unsustainable political systems,
and limited business openness. This presents significant issues about the adaptability,
accessibility, and stability of the assets they are seeking to invest in (Curto 2010). With that
said, fund manager will have to confront these conflicts with uncertainty when making portfolio
decisions and investing in developing economies.
On the other hand, nations receiving SWF financing will have to consider the risks of
these state-owned investment funds (Sharma 2018). This follows Minsky's (2008) concern that
the stability of emerging economies, as well as the investment prospects of developed
economies, depends upon how capital assets are financed. Thus, host countries receiving SWF
investment must adapt to the possibility of capital misalignment and market disequilibrium, as a
result of mismanaged foreign capital. In fact, capital fluctuations or rapid changes in
international flows can cause inflationary or deflationary pressure and disrupt financial markets,
thus, limiting a developing economy with the ability to achieve dynamic economic and social
growth.
Since the abandonment of the Bretton Woods agreement, developing countries have
been consistently concerned about capital fluctuations, and capital flows from industrialized
nations. Market instability in a developing economy can occur if there is a sudden shift in the
foreign private sector capital disposition, which causes investors to withdrawal or inject new
capital (Gallagher 2012). In the 20th century, J.M. Keynes and Raul Prebisch advocated that
nations can employ countercyclical macroeconomic management tools, such as capital controls,
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to help maintain economic stability and national self-sufficiency (Gallagher 2012). As cited in
Crotty (1983), Keynes wrote: "the central control of capital movements both inward and
outward, should be a permanent feature of the post-war system." While others on the "freetrade" side of the argument believed that the use of capital controls limits a nation's productivity,
financial diversity, and economic growth; proponents of laissez-faire economic policy advocate
that free capital flows dramatically improve a country's prospects for development, prosperity,
and economic efficiency (Guerin, 2013). Like all institutional investors, SWFs can shift their
capital positions, but in most cases, their mandates and procedures that govern these funds limit
their capacity to do so. In many cases, Gnomes (2008) shows that SWFs can bring stability to
developing markets given their large scale of capital under management and their long-term
investment horizons.
Additionally, many host nations are concerned about whether capital from governmentsponsored investors will be used for strategic non–financial purpose, i.e., gaining access to
valuable information and for other deceptive acts. This follows Keynes, who once said "that all
international cash flows are inherently political" (Gallagher 2012). Many development
economists have stated repeated concerns over nontransparent investment from SWFs posing
destabilizing threats to developing markets and triggering behavior among investors. Although
much of these fears are often unjustified and their criticisms exaggerated, transparency is still
definitely an issue with the relationship between investor and host nations (Guerin 2013).
Despite repeated efforts to improve transparency, some SWFs still fail to report their portfolio
strategies and investment information. This follows Gnomes (2010), who mentions that opacity
is a feature in many SWFs, especially those from developing economies. Therefore, when
considering any foreign capital, host governments should weigh the risks and advantages of
protectionist retaliation against investors who might pursue strategic investments, while at the
same time, they should measure the impact that protectionist strategies will have on the
international financial markets and their own domestic economy.
In order to address the transparency issues arising from SWFs, the Santiago Principles
were established in 2008 (Sharma 2018). The Santiago Principles are a series of universal
principles that aim to improve transparency among SWF governance. The agreement outlines
twenty-four common practical items of guidance for appropriate governance, accountability
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arrangements, and long-term investment procedures. The reporting and disclosure of SWF
portfolio information in accordance with the Santiago Principles relies entirely on voluntary
self-assessment and is at the discretion of the SWF managers. Alex Buteica and Catalin Petrescu
(2017) suggests that a number of steps are necessary to improve the effectiveness of the
Santiago Principles, namely: improving disclosure practices; improving the quality of
compliance self-assessments; relying on third-party verifications of compliance with the
Santiago Principles; and exploring the possibility for regulations to recognize and endorse the
Santiago Principles formally. Although the establishment of the Santiago principles was a step
in the right direction, the main problem is that these principles are not legally binding, and such
initiatives have mostly fallen short in providing proper measurement tool that weigh the impact
of SWF investment. Buteica and Petrescu (2017) recommend that SWFs be required to publicly
display earnings, portfolio strategies, and holdings in accordance with international law.
As such, there is still a greater need for enhanced financial management and
transparency investment practices. Therefore, it is imperative that fund managers initiate
management tools and measurements to ensure the efficiency and accountability of their
investments. As such, in order to lower information asymmetries, ensure sound fund
governance, and diminish corruption, then mandatory international reporting standards must be
applied to SWFs. By merely making investment information, public information, can drastically
lower uncertainty and risks, for both investors and host nations. While requiring investors to
report portfolio information is difficult, it is also a critical step in lowering investment
asymmetries and capital inefficiencies (UNEP 2017). Therefore, in order to transition into a
sustainable economy, its increasingly important that both SWFs, host countries, and
international regulators work together to improve transparency practices, investment strategies,
and financial standards.
The goal of this report is to show that all SWFs globally can contribute to a sustainable
economy; however, failure to implement transparency standards can prove detrimental to SDG
progress. Addressing this issue, Voysey et al. (2016) notes there have been some valiant efforts
to improve investor transparency and to implement universally accepted practices, such as the
establishment of the Principles for Responsible Investing, the International Forum on Sovereign
Wealth Funds (IFSWF), Institutional Investor Roundtable, and the Linaburg-Maduell
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Transparency Index (Voysey et al. 2016). These international agreements and financing tools
have been effective at promoting greater transparency and adherence to investment practices for
institutional investors. Each new transparency tool and policy has helped resolve some of the
uncertainty that countries face when receiving SWF capital. Yet without a universal system that
integrates transparency standards into investment governance will limit the capacity for SWFs
to manage assets properly.

Private Market Alternative Investing and Strategies
Traditionally, most SWFs funds focus their portfolio distribution on assets in developed
countries, mostly in bonds and equities. A characteristic of typical SWF is to take positions on
safe, liquid investments offering low to mid returns (Gnomes 2008). In fact, Emmanuel Guerin
(2013) notes that SWFs hold an ownership stake of around 8 percent of the publicly traded
shares globally. Considering these factors, in the past decade, the United States, UK, and
Germany have been the primary beneficiaries of most SWF capital. According to Rajiv Sharma
(2018) many SWFs have already been participating in financing the SDGs related to growth (8),
climate (13), conservation (14, 15), infrastructure (7), and consumption and production (12) by
virtue of their portfolio exposure in the public markets (Sharma 2018).
Consequently, SWFs position in the public market space limits the impact they can have
on sustainable development because they can only influence assets through secondary exposure,
via stakeholder engagement or through overseeing which firms receive financing. However,
secondary exposure cannot be the source of change if progress is to be made on the SDGs,
especially given the time constraint of achieving them by 2030. According to Capape (2018), if
SWFs or any other institutional investor are genuinely going to support the SDGs, they must
have more in-depth exposure into private markets, in regions where capital is thin.
Vorsey et al. (2016) explain that many SWFs have already realigned portfolio strategies
toward private market alternative assets, such as in infrastructure and real estate. For instance,
SWFs spent 62 percent of all foreign direct investment (FDI) on real estate and infrastructure in
2016; comparatively speaking, the average only four years earlier stood below 30 percent
(UNEP 2017). According to Capape and Santivanez (2017), on average these two asset
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(infrastructure and real estate) classes represent a quarter of all transactions made by SWFs
since 2010. This correlates with a growing trend among SWFs who see private market assets as
more attractive. For example, in 2007 only 12 percent of SWF assets were allocated to private
markets; by 2017, private market assets represented over 30 percent of portfolio holdings. To
put this in context, in 2007 SWFs only spent around $288 billion in private market financing,
but by 2016 that sum had increased by 460 percent to $1.6 trillion value of total SWF asset
allocation (UNEP 2017). As noted, Capape and Santivanez (2017) just in private equity alone,
SWF's holdings grew more than 14 percent between 2015–2017. As such, by the end of 2017,
SWFs had invested more in the private markets than in cash and fixed income assets, which
only represented 28 percent of portfolio holdings (UNEP 2017).
Even traditionally minded SWF managers, who seek to invest in low-risk assets and to
protect portfolio positions from market uncertainty, have shown intentions to move into
developing economies and allocate more resources into the private markets (Guerin 2013). One
benefit that investors see in transferring to private markets is that in many cases, portfolio
returns are becoming higher as compared to public markets. Other benefits include having more
direct control over strategies, planning, and implementation processes of long–term projects and
assets. Despite the benefits, an investors ability to move to alternative assets depends mainly on
the individual asset manager appetite for risk. In other words, an alternative investment must
align with investors mandates. Due to this, not all institutional investors have been able to shift
into private markets. For example, pension funds are often highly leveraged and are pinched for
returns, insurance companies are limited by their mandates, and hedge funds already maintain
positioning in both the public and private spheres. Meanwhile, SWFs have been very versatile
with their private market strategies, as they have moved away from a passive approach to asset
management to a more proactive investment strategy. Just in 2015–2017, the share of total SWF
investing in developing economies infrastructure and real estate increased from 59 percent to 63
percent (Capape and Santivanez 2017).
Stefano Curto (2010) highlights that as compared to developed economies, developing
nations offer opportunities for economic growth, business investment, and stable long-term
returns as compared to public markets. As such, SWFs have enormous potential to revert the
savings and capital holdings generated in surplus countries toward the developing world, where
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capital can be more productive and efficient. Curto (2010) continues to explain that it is
essential that SWFs to consider employing more capital to developing economies because there
are more direct investment opportunities in these regions. Moreover, allocating SWF capital to
developing economies is important for a few reasons: they could become a driving force in
north-south, and south-south flows, as funds mobilize capital into developing markets and viceversa; they could help stabilize capital markets, as was seen in the most–recent financial crisis
and the can be a catalyst for financing long-term investment projects (Thomas 2018). In short,
SWFs have a tremendous capacity to influence the sustainable development in developing
economies, while at the same time, they can create more dynamic opportunities for themselves
and the nations they operate in. Notably, by realigning values and increasing private market
financing (infrastructure, real estate, and venture capital) SWFs can have more impact on
sustainable infrastructure development than other investors (UNEP 2017).

Sovereign Wealth Fund Portfolio Allocation and Impact Investing
Capape and Santivanez (2017) recommend that to have a positive impact on green growth and
the SDGs, SWF's have a few different avenues they can go down. These include initiating
decarbonization strategies by divesting in high carbon exposed companies; investing in green
assets, such sustainable infrastructure and agriculture; or support renewable energy companies
in both public and private markets. But as mentioned, the greatest impact that SWFs can have
on sustainable development is through direct investments in the private markets, particularly in
infrastructure (Sharma 2018). A few dynamic funds have taken actionable to increase private
market investment allocation on assets that relate to an SDG or many SDGs. Since the
establishment of the 2030 Agenda, SWFs have already committed $4.3 billion to green assets,
invested over $3.5 billion in renewable energy companies, and are currently financing $2.2
billion in green infrastructure funds. (Capape and Santivanez 2017). In all SWF investment in
renewable assets between the period of 2015 –2017 was about $11 billion, but still was only a
small proportion of their current market allocations. Additionally, of the $11 billion that SWFs
spent on green finance, only $2.2 billion was allocated into green infrastructure assets (Sharma
2018).
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As impact investors, SWFs can apply climate change related asset into their long-term
portfolio assets and take actionable steps to lower those risks. According to Simon Zadek and
Nick Robins (2014) through proactive ownership, SWFs who adhere to the sustainable
principles can apply stakeholder power to encourage companies and governments to withdraw
from fossil fuel assets and reallocate funds to more sustainable resources. Additionally, their
prominent position in public, corporate ownership also allows them to apply pressure to other
shareholders and public investors, pushing them toward investments that meet the SDG
principles. For example, Norway's SWF has been able to influence companies and projects they
invest in, to improve on issues ranging from cultural diversity to specifics about executive
payment. The example set by Norway, motivated other asset managers to apply similar
strategies, such as the Nigeria Sovereign Investment Authority (NGIA), who now applies a
robust SDG framework to assess potential companies prior to investing in them (Thomas 2018).
Sharma (2018) mentions that by 2017, the total value of all divestments from non-renewable
energy made by decarbonized portfolios amounted to $2.9 billion. That same year, 42 percent of
the SWF industry reported they use the SDGs to measure and report the social impact of their
portfolios (Sharma 2018). Figure 7 shows the aggregate portfolio share of green investments
under the management of SWFs. As shown in the chart between 2006–2016, less than 1 percent
of total SWF assets were allocated to green investment, but since the establishment of the 2030
Agenda, there has been a definite uptick in SWFs funding green assets, reaching nearly 3.5
percent of total asset under management in 2016.

Figure 7. Percentage of Portfolio Allocated to Green Investments, 2006–2016
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While some improvements have been made in green investments, most SWFs still
allocate little capital without considering green sectors in their investment mandates and even
less mention social concerns in portfolio decisions. Many investors still carry traditional beliefs
that incorporating environmental, social, and governance (ESG) analysis in portfolio decisions
will be detrimental to the overall performance (Capape 2018). This issue was addressed by
Carolina Nowacki and Ashby Monk (2018) who explain that investors remain hesitant to invest
in long-term unlisted and illiquid sustainable assets due to perceived lower returns compared to
traditional non–renewable assets. Additionally, this correlates with the belief that renewable and
infrastructure assets offer less capital mobility and are difficult to liquidate (Behrendt 2015).
Also, according to the Linaburg–Maduell Transparency Index, as of 2018, only eight SWFs
publicly disclosed their strategies on climate change and their solutions for filling the green
finance gap (Sharma 2018). Truth be told, most SWFs have not positioned themselves as a
qualitatively new source for financing sustainable development or ESG assets, and many still
have no plans to do so (Behrendt 2015). Of the 81 SWFs that currently exist, only 21 have
issued some sort of public strategy on green investment financing, and, in an overwhelming
number of cases, SWFs mainly focus on optimizing financial returns, not social ones. Overall,
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though the total value of SWF participation in private green finance and green investments for
the period 2015–2017 was around $11 billion, this represents only 0.15 percent of all SWF
assets under management (Capape 2018). In short, if progress on the SDGs is to be made, SWFs
must be more proactive to align their goals with sustainable products.
Capape and Santivanez (2017) note that attitude for green investments is changing. In a
survey of 45 SWFs in 2017, 84 percent said they have a strong desire to diversify assets into
high growth developing markets in order to maximize returns and promote responsible investing
practices. Conversely, to date, there are a few SWFs who have already invested in renewable
energy corporations, projects, and directed capital towards sustainable and climate-oriented debt
assets. This follows a growing trend among many SWFs who are reliant on revenues from
nonrenewable resources to diversify their economies away from hydrocarbons by tapping into
burgeoning sectors such as clean technology, low-carbon transportation, and sustainable
infrastructure (Curto 2010). For example, SWFs in Australia, France, Ireland, New Zealand, and
Norway have implemented climate-related investment strategies, but only Norway and New
Zealand have integrated climate risks into their asset reporting procedures (Sharma 2018).
Additionally, the Ireland Strategic Investment Fund has been able to form efficient green
portfolio strategies, by applying stakeholder pressure on companies and governments to
improve management practices and direct more capital towards the SDG-related assets (Capape
2018). While the examples set by these funds has shown an indication that the sustainable
development agenda has opportunities in the SWF industry, there is still a long way to go.

Sovereign Wealth Funds: Sustainable Investing in Developing Economies
Although sustainable development has not been explicitly on the radar screen of the SWF
managers in the past, it does not mean that it will need to remain absent in the future. The recent
trends in the wake of the 2030 Agenda suggest that investor attitudes are more sympathetic to
green assets and sustainable infrastructure. For example, the Government Pension of Norway
reformed its SWF mission statement to include the focus: "to contribute to efficient and wellfunctioning markets and to promote work on international standards for responsible investing"
(Capape 2018). Additionally, some progressive governments have also made significant impacts
on SDGs, i.e., France established the Green Transition laws, which require institutional
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investors to report climate change risk and the carbon footprint of their assets under
management (Capape 2018). The Peoples' Republic of China just launched initiatives requiring
investors to transfer vital capital to green energy sectors and clean transportation infrastructures.
Furthermore, demographic pressures, social movements, government policies, and changes
about the perceived risks associated with sustainable assets are factors that may help improve
green infrastructure spending from SWF (Capape 2018).
While there are no universally accepted standards for measuring SWF impact on SDGs
in the aggregate, it is safe to say that the field of climate finance has been improved by the
creation of many climate–policy-oriented institutions and groups. One example is the One
Planet Sovereign Wealth Fund Working Group, formed in 2017 with the primary mission, "to
accelerate efforts to integrate financial risks and opportunities related to sustainable assets into
the management of large long-term investors" (One Planet Summit 2018). The UN is the
founding member of the Green Fiscal Policy Network, a web-based platform which aims to
disseminate knowledge and policies to enhance SDG investment opportunities (Sharma 2018).
Lastly, the creation of the Sovereign Wealth Institute enables cross-fund discussion, facilitates
data services, and provides research on global projects that need financing (Capapé 2017). In all,
these organizational shifts among global partners have made sustainable assets more accessible
for SWFs and have opened new opportunities for corporations, communities, and developing
economies.
New tools relating capital alignment and asset management, have been created to help
investors, such as SWFs, bypass working through private equity structures to enable them to
focus capital on long-term sustainable sectors directly. One such tool for analyzing potential
sustainable infrastructure projects is designed by Aligned Intermediary (AI). According to
Nowacki and Monk (2018), AI develops financial tools, standardizations, and specifications that
guide investors through long-term climate infrastructure projects. AI was founded in 2015 as a
White House initiative to help investors source, screen, enact due diligence, and implement
green infrastructure and technologies in order to connect them with long-term investors.
Currently, AI works with nine SWFs, who have already committed over $1.4 billion to
sustainable sectors. Other initiatives that seem promising are the International Investors
Roundtable (IIR) created in 2010 to identify areas where investors could collaborate on
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investments. Essentially, the IRR helps investors guide capital toward sustainable sectors that
offer investors the chance to maximize long–term risk-adjusted returns (Nowacki and Monk
2018). Both these organizations support the development of a standard measurement system that
would increase the effectiveness of SWF investments and can help fund managers optimize
portfolio performance.
Even though these initiatives and strategies have been sufficient to a certain degree at
aligning investors with climate target and assets, incorporating climate–risks into investors'
portfolios is still challenging (UNEP 2017). While numerous studies have shown that
sustainable assets are more dynamic and profitable for long-term investors, without metrics to
prove long-term value and overall returns improvements, it may be hard to convince investors to
make the shift. To shift SWF behavior will require a concentrated effort addressing attitudes and
investment operations all the way through incorporating relevant criteria into portfolio
processes. In fact, the existing asset indexes, such as the Cisco Discovery Protocol Global
Climate Index and Intergovernmental the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures
(TCFD), allow only for an approximation of the impact that investment have on the climate and
mostly focus just on the portfolio management rather that transition-level improvement for
green investments (Sharma 2018). However, the climate infrastructure industry is demanding a
robust international classification system based on asset standardizations that can help measure
the impact of private sector capital on SDGs and their overall the socioeconomic goals. While
the investment tools and innovations like those designed by AI provide hope, measuring SWF
progress in green infrastructure will be increasingly difficult without mandatory SWF
disclosures, reporting standards, and transparency practices.

Co-Investment Opportunities and Investment Strategies
SWFs face mounting risks when investing in new ventures, especially in uncertain markets and
in assets marked by information asymmetries. Building on the last section, many SWFs have
been proactively searching for ways to lower systemic risk, improve returns, and allocate more
sustainable finance. The 2030 SDGs and the Paris climate targets provide an excellent roadmap
for investors to explore new innovative techniques for acquiring more sustainable assets and
increasing the global efforts to address climate change. A growing theme among SWF
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management is employing new strategies, such as collaborative investing and co-investment
partnerships (Nowacki and Monk 2018). In fact, 2015 there were over 590 co-investment
arrangements, which was twice the number of collaborative partnerships than in 2007
(Andersson, Bolton, and Samama 2016) As such given the growing number of partnerships and
co-financing arrangements among institutional financiers; such new financial arrangements will
be increasingly crucial for sustainable investment (Nowacki and Monk 2018; Capape 2018).
This because collaborative investing, allows investors to increase transparency, implement
effective management practices, and finance more green projects while at the same time,
decreasing overall risks and market uncertainty.
Such investment initiatives feature collaboration between partners that have unique
strengths that can be applied to capital–demanding projects. For example, SWFs, which are
inherently government-backed, could partner with high–performing private equity firms to
improve investment performance, financial stability, and diversity in investments (Capape
2018). Furthermore, these collaborative investing techniques allow investment firms to hedge
their portfolio exposure to different market segments and reduce long-term risks in capital
projects (Andersson, Bolton, and Samama 2016). Additionally, these co-investment
arrangements have allowed large global investors with substantial long-term assets under
management to partner with top money managers and even with activist organizations
throughout the world, too improve the efficiency of their investments. Take for example, Abu
Dubai’s SWF partnership with the global commodity trading company Trafigura in 2015, the
two firms were able to buy three metal mines in Spain and jointly acquire a controlling stake in
the iron ore port in Brazil, thus providing jobs and vital economic growth to these regions
(Andersson, Bolton, and Samama 2016). These projects had better outcomes because the longterm capital backing of Dubai was able to be optimized through the risk/return strategies that
Trafigura implemented.
Another critical aspect of these co-financing arrangements is the ability to transfer a
greater capacity of savings to large financial projects, necessitate capital into inadequate
markets, and transform wealth into meeting the SDGs, mainly investing in infrastructure
development (Nowacki and Monk 2018). These benefits can be seen in partnerships, like the
New York-based Global Infrastructure Partners (GIP) and China Investment Corporation (CIC)
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who announced the acquisition of a portfolio of Asian Wind and Solar Energy projects for $3.7
billion. GIP was able to advise and share its knowledge of infrastructure finance, whereas CIC
was able to provide stable long-term capital. When finalized in 2019, the energy project will be
the largest renewable energy infrastructure acquisition in history (Nowacki and Monk 2018).
Additionally, financial stability and market issues can be addressed in emerging market when
investors partner with multilateral organizations that foster greater transparency and openness in
transactions (Gnomes 2010). For example, the partnership between the International Finance
Corporation (IFC) and Vietnams’ SWF State Capital Investment Corporation, enabled greater
investment stability and cooperation in acquiring state-owned companies in Vietnam (Nowacki
and Monk 2018).
As the 2030 Agenda gains further traction, investors will face consistent pressure to
transition to sustainable portfolios; as such these co-investment arrangements provide an
opportunity to build diversity in their portfolios while at the same time making an impact on the
SDGs. Nowacki and Monk (2018) explain that partnerships that focus on improving green
development will require that these shared portfolio investors be persistent in promoting ESG
criteria over existing assets and future investment projects. These partnerships can utilize the
strengths of all actors and enhance knowledge, expertise, and bring capital stability to long-term
green projects. However, the extent to which co–investment arrangements actively engage with
SDGs will depend on firms, capacities, and the individual partner's investment objectives
(Glancy 2012; Baker 2018). For example, in 2017 the Abu–Dubai Based SWF, created a joint
investment fund with China’s Development Bank Capital and with China’s State Administration
of Foreign Exchange to enhance mutual infrastructure spending in both countries. The
partnerships aim is to look “at a range of alternative investment strategies, asset classes, and
special opportunities, including greenfield investment projects, with the goal of building a
balanced portfolio focused on sustainable” (Sharma 2018).
The management and governance structure of these partnerships varies, but usually, such
arrangements are managed partly in-house by a group of individual managers and partly by
external financial managers working on the project in a collaborative manner (Klemper and
Tarnoswki 2017). The task of managing co–financing arrangements is challenging because of
the difference in partners management style, culture practices, and a dissimilar appetite for risks
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among individual investors. A well-managed co-investment project can support the delivery of
the SDGs and sustainable infrastructure by helping to improve the quality of financing,
strengthening board values, earmarking high–impact projects, and promoting green, ethical
investments. Such arrangements could accelerate investments in companies who are socially
conscious and finance sustainably and inclusive development projects (Nowacki and Monk
2018). In an era in which traditional finance is retracting, the impact of these associated
partnerships will be crucial to funding future development and financial patterns in developing
economies (Sharma 2018).
More institutional investors and not just SWFs should continue to partner with
governments and multilateral organizations to address the SDGs through sustainable
infrastructure investment. For examples international collaborative partnerships could enhance
the social and economic SDGs related to (1) poverty, (2) hunger, (4) quality education, (5)
gender equality, (10) reduced inequalities, and (16) social justice institutions. These partnerships
can improve access to new markets, open new financial opportunities, and enable higher
financial returns for each partner (Nowacki and Monk 2018). Some arrangements will focus
more on earning higher returns and improving portfolio outlooks, while others will focus on
more strategic considerations and financial stability, such as employing funds in capital
depressed markets. Accordingly, partnerships can reap benefits by anticipating the global shift
into green assets and scale–up investments in (7) energy, (11) cities, (13) climate, (9)
infrastructure, and (6) water, through agreements that focus on these financing opportunities
(Sharma 2018).
Consider the co-investment arrangement between the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority
(AIA) and British Columbia Investment Management Corporation teaming up with Macquarie
to buy the energy supplier Open Grid Europe in 2016 (Nowacki and Monk 2018). The financial
backing of the AIA combined with the high-transparent management practices of the Canadians
provided capital stability and certainty within the partnership. Another notable example is the
investment partnerships between international organizations, such as the European Union and
the Government Pension Fund of Norway, under this agreement Norway’s SWF divested all the
capital that it had in non-renewable energy sources and reverted funds to sustainable assets.
These partnerships demonstrate that co-investment strategies can deliver more efficient goods,
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lower asymmetries between investors and governments, build effective financial networks, and
promote the SDGs in the process.

Policy Recommendations
With substantial long-term assets under management and government-backed capital, SWFs are
in a unique position to fund development objectives outlined in the 2030 Agenda. They have the
potential to make the largest contribution to the SDGs that require long-term investments
relating to infrastructure and real estate. Three approaches could influence SWF investment in
these sustainable development assets and contribute to the SDGs.
First, the mandates that control the objectives of the SWFs must include a principle that
applies ESG criteria when analyzing potential investments. The extent to which SWFs engage
with green investment will depend on their risk appetite, mandates, and internal capacities
(Capape 2018). Given that SWFs have long-term horizons, sustainable investment and climaterelated concerns should align with their mandates. But at the present, many funds view
investments that focus on an ESG criteria will compromise financial returns. Capape (2018)
recommends that a genuine policy shift will need to take place within the mandates of funds
from an external standpoint (governments and citizens) and in the internal management. This
shift should help managers promote the benefits of green finance, align portfolio goals with
green investments, and consider engaging in development as direct owners of sustainable assets.
This follows the "One Planet Sovereign Wealth Fund" recommendation that investors align
long-term investment horizons with climate change considerations (Sharma 2018). An effective
way to increase awareness of sustainable initiatives is through improving regulatory and
financial market advocacy efforts which encourages investors to transition to sustainable
portfolio practices.
Second, SWFs have been hesitant to shift focus into developing economies due to the
perceived higher risks and lower attractiveness of the assets in these economies. This problem
relates to the individual investors' appetite for risks and their willingness to allocate funds into
uncertain regions. Despite this, SWFs should recognize the numerous opportunities developing
regions, particularly for investors with reliable long-term private capital. Infrastructure assets in
these economies are in dire need of financing; this issue presents a perfect opportunity for SWFs
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whose long-term horizons fit well with these products. This can be achieved through improving
engagement with governments, data collection, expanding performance/risk metrics, and
through partnering with experts or existing investors in these regions.
Finally, the investment themes of SWFs relate very well to those outlined in the 2030
Development Agenda. As such, SWFs should recognize that investments in sustainable
development can help them meet their financial performance objectives and achieve societal
goals as well. To achieve this, SWF should analyze how individual SDGs or multiple SDGS can
translate into long-term investment opportunities. They will also have to go beyond just
choosing the SDGs the fit well into their portfolios, but also consider the SDGs that are more
difficult to obtain. As Behrendt (2015) says, "what is needed is investment products that
incorporate these social objectives and offer attractive commercial returns." In particular, the
social goals of (1) no poverty, (2) zero hunger, (4) quality education, (5) gender equality, (10)
reduced inequalities, and (16) strong institutions are currently challenging to address (Sharma
2018). In short, SWFs should consider a variety of options when engaging in the SDGs, the
process of reallocating funds to sustainable assets requires careful coordination among the
investors and the host nations they invest in.
Although SWFs can make a tremendous impact on achieving the SDGs, the green
portfolio transition process is a large constraint for many investors. One of the main issues that
SWFs face is the lack of clarity in portfolio decisions and a weak management structure,
contributes to inadequate strategy disclosure, fund opaqueness, and low performance (Capape
2018). Since SWFs are inherently political and are highly exposed to public opinion, uncertainty
in portfolio discretion is consistently a burden for fund managers. To resolve this issue, SWF
managers should implement secure governance practices that help ensure efficiency and
accountability of investments to lessen the burden on their partners. Sound fund governance
practice will define proper investment mandates, provide incentives for effective fiduciary
practices, and enable the monitoring of shareholder preferences. Thus, achieving efficient
governance practices requires that SWFs improve reporting standards, disclosure investment
strategies, and be able to clarify fund objectives. (UNEP 2017).
The One Planet Sovereign Wealth Fund (2018) recommended that SWF managers
integrate climate-related risks into their portfolios to improve the resilience of long-term
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investment positions. Fund managers should also take the lead in the global investor community
by integrating an ESG criteria in their investment analysis. Capape (2018) recommends that
SWFs use ESG metrics to appraise investments across their entire portfolio. As SWFs optimize
more low-carbon investments, they should form partnerships with organizations such as the
Financial Stability Board Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) and
Aligned Intermediary who seek to help investors coordinate their strategies with more green
initiatives (Sharma 2018). However, in accordance with their objectives and the progress they
have made, it is still clear that SWFs managers still have much work to do.
Likewise, governments have a role to play in attracting SWF investments into their
capital-deprived projects and their overall economy. This could include building a more
sustainable project pipeline, streamlining contractual processes with investors, providing
government-backed guarantees for sustainable infrastructure investments, and making long-term
tax incentives for sustainable investments. In general, the profitability of low carbon, resource–
efficient, and environmentally friendly investment projects depend on setting up public policies
that ingrate climate change related risk within assets and capital projects (Nowacki and Monk
2018). Policy makers will need to coordinate investment measurements criteria (like ESG
criteria) for SWFs who are interested in investing in their economies. Such measurement
metrics should be provided to SWFs so that they can appraise projects and measure them across
their entire portfolios to ensure they are in line with the SDGs (Sharma 2018).
Additionally, governments have a role to play in aligning investments to the most capital
deprived SDGs, such as in infrastructure (7) or health (9). The methods that governments use to
measure, and value sustainable projects should promote the quality of climate-related financial
information and support the assessment of the climate risks associated with investments.
Inherently investors will be more attracted to specific economies whose governments offer
policy coordination that decreases asset opaqueness and provide them with accurate
performance/risk data (Capape 2018). These measurements can also offer further details on how
investors can translate assets in these economies into long-term investments that specifically
address an SDG or multiple SDGs.
In order to address the risks, uncertainty, and poor investment outcomes in developing
economies, SWFs and long-term investors have employed collaborative investing models, such
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as co-investment arrangements and financial partnerships to enable further symmetry within
capital projects, lower investment opaqueness, and offer diversity in asset ownership (Nowacki
and Monk 2018). These collaborative investing techniques have shown to be especially crucial
in financing SDG–related assets and for long-term private market assets, such as infrastructure
and real estate. Most of the time, actors enter co-financing partnership seeking to strengthen
networks, stabilize funding requirements, and achieve more of their management goals. By way
of alliances, investors can partner with other investors or governments and commit to sharing
information, collaborate on a specific theme, and create further opportunities for those affected
by their investments (Nowacki and Monk 2018). On the other hand, host governments should
encourage co-financing agreements because it better protects them from market issues, such as
capital flight, stemming from investor choices. It also ensures that funds will not be used
strategically and lowers transparency issues. Indeed, collaborative investing has shown
improvements in both the projects effectiveness over the long-run and provided higher portfolio
returns for investors, while at the same time lowering concerns for host governments.
In short, a growing proportion of financial actors and SWFs have made commitments to
align their operations with climate change objectives and sustainable development assets. The
reasons for this shift have been more a factor of investors finding unique ways to impact climate
finance policies. Due to these changes, uncertainty and risks have decreased within green
investment because of the improvements have been made between host governments and
investors. As coordination has improved, governments have been able to show that green
projects have positive future returns and offer investment stability for long-term investors. As
such, investors looking to contribute to the SDGs have been very responsive to governments
who provide a guidance on long-term sustainable assets. Based on these past successes, it is my
recommendation that for sustainable assets to be more valued, that SWFs, as well as other
investors, enact transparency standards and climate-risk metrics in their portfolios, whereas
governments and international organizations should enforce those standards.

VI. CONCLUSION
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The members of the United Nations’ unanimous agreement on the 2030 Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) reflects the environmental and development concerns facing
nations throughout the world. These goals recognize that the preservation of our planet is a
collective effort, requiring the action from all nations, investors, and corporations. As the world
transitions into a sustainable and more inclusive economy, financing the SDGs will be a
tremendous obstacle. The failure of past climate policies to reverse the effects of climate change
has undoubtedly increased skepticism about whether the principles of the sustainable
development agenda will be implemented. Caritas International (2015) said, "That the ambitions
of the SDGs and their broad objectives have prompted uncertainty over whether these principles
will be effectively put into practice." Even UNTCAD (2015) recognized that these SDGs are
incredibly ambitious, especially when climate-related assets pose additional challenges, such as
poor measurement techniques and low-carbon progress ratings.
Undoubtedly, achieving development goals requires significant changes in the current
financial structure and regulatory framework. Therefore, financing a transformative
development agenda will require greater investor adaptability and multilateral cooperation that
ensures the availability of resources to be used more strategically. Even more, so will be the
importance placed on improving investor depth and adopting an industrial design that
incentivizes institutional investors to finance SDG-related assets and long-term sustainable
projects. Furthermore, the existing sustainable framework that attracts financing from both
private and public sources should be maintained and improved. This can be achieved by offering
more innovative mechanisms and investment tools to help investors mitigate risks and realign
portfolios to sustainable assets.
Governments in developing economies have the responsibility to attract capital to
achieve the SDGs while at the same time focusing on their own domestic agendas. This could be
done through increasing the number of sustainable bankable projects that mitigate long-term
asset risks, disseminates project information, and facilitates stable public sector coordination.
Providing a proper pipeline of bankable sustainable infrastructure projects is not easy and
requires comprehensive long-term planning, including cooperating with partners, organizations,
investors, and existing projects.
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Despite the risks in adjusting to a new financial framework, a well-managed transition to
a low-carbon economy presents material benefits and opportunities for investors (Glancy 2012).
Institutional investors will need to step up efforts in financing global development needs and
realign their strategies the achieving SDGs, particularly in developing economies. Some of these
investors are in better positions to have more of an impact in meeting the long-term financing
commitments as demanded by SDG-related assets. SWFs have a comparative advantage over
traditional financial institutions due to their inherent characteristics and financing sources.
SWFs are, by definition, backed by the governments who created them to achieve many
socioeconomic goals. These government backed funds are prime candidates to make impacts on
the SDGs because they have a low risk of insolvency, usually take long-term financing
outlooks, and the socioeconomic goals outlined in the 2030 Agenda fit well with the investment
mandates of most SWFs. SDGs related to energy, infrastructure, sustainability, and production
resonate with the mandates of SWFs and are the most important to transition into a sustainable
economy.
While there is currently an aversion to sustainable investment given the perceived higher
risks and lower returns among SDG assets, such attitudes are changing rapidly among SWFs. In
the post-SDG world, SWFs as well as other investors, have become more attracted to alternative
private market investing, such as long-term sustainable infrastructure. As such, the long-term
capital offered by these SWFs will be crucial to fill the financing gaps across a variety of SDGrelated assets. Beyond creating a collaborative environment in which long-term investors can
contribute to sustainable sectors, it is useful to recognize that transitioning into green sectors
presents great opportunities for these investors. As such, many investors are finding creative
ways to mitigate risks, improve data collection, and create techniques to judge long-term
investment options. Other investors have employed more collaborative techniques to reach their
goals, these including multilateral agreements, international conventions, and co-financing
arrangements. While there have been significant improvements in achieving a sustainable
future, more than ever, financing sustainable assets require fresh thinking about the role that
investors must play and demands a greater willingness from policymakers to act. Only through
cooperation and transparency will investors, governments, and corporations be able to avert the
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potential incidents that will harm the planet. It must be within this unifying spirit that these
global actors and policies seize the vision of a free and inclusive world.
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